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ARTICLE

REDISTRICTING AND THE TERRITORIAL COMMUNITY

NICHOLAS O. STEPHANOPOULOS

†

As the current redistricting cycle unfolds, the courts are stuck in limbo. The
Supreme Court has held unanimously that political gerrymandering can be unconstitutional—but it has also rejected every standard suggested to date for distinguishing lawful from unlawful district plans. This Article offers a way out
of the impasse. It proposes that courts resolve gerrymandering disputes by examining how well districts correspond to organic geographic communities. Districts ought to be upheld when they coincide with such communities, but struck
down when they unnecessarily disrupt them.
This approach, which I call the “territorial community test,” has a robust
theoretical pedigree. In fact, the proposition that communities develop geographically and require legislative representation has won wide acceptance for most of
American history. The courts have also employed variants of the test (without
scholars previously having noticed) in several related fields: reapportionment,
racial gerrymandering, racial vote dilution, etc. The principle of districtcommunity congruence thus animates much of the relevant case law already.
The test is largely unscathed, furthermore, by the unmanageability critique that
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has doomed every other potential redistricting standard. The courts have shown
for decades that they can compare district and community boundaries, and the
social science literature confirms the feasibility of such comparisons. Finally, the
political implications of the test’s adoption would likely be positive. My empirical analysis suggests that partisan bias would decrease, relative to the status
quo, while electoral responsiveness and voter participation would rise.
It is true that the territorial community test does not directly address partisan motives or outcomes. But the Court has made clear that it views these issues
as doctrinal dead ends. Ironically, the only way left to combat gerrymandering
might be to strike at something other than its heart.
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INTRODUCTION
The decennial bloodsport of redistricting is now underway. Across
America, state legislatures are busy drawing new electoral district lines
based on the results of the 2010 Census. These new district lines, of
course, will produce both winners and losers. Some political parties
will gain seats while others will lose them. Some incumbents will have
their districts fortified while others will be thrown to the wolves. Some
minority groups will be able to elect the candidates of their choice
while others will be engulfed by the surrounding majority.
In typical American fashion, many of the losers of the redistricting
1
wars are seeking redress in court. For better or worse, the doctrine
that governs most of their claims—unequal district population, racial
vote dilution, racial gerrymandering, retrogression, etc.—is relatively
2
clear. But in one crucial area, that of political gerrymandering, the
case law is in chaos, at the levels of both theory and practice. The relevant scholarly literature is less confused but equally fragmented.

1

For more on the ongoing litigation over electoral district lines since the 2010
Census, see Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING,
http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
2
Political gerrymandering is usually defined as the drawing of electoral districts in
order (1) to advance one major party’s interests at the other’s expense or (2) to protect
the incumbents of both parties. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999)). While not quarreling with this definition, this Article also conceives of political gerrymandering in a third
way: as the drawing of district lines in such a way that organic territorial communities
are disrupted. Cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 177 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part) (“The problem of the gerrymander is
how to defeat or circumvent the sentiments of the community.”).
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There is thus an urgent doctrinal and academic need for new ideas, as
well as for some coherence where now there is mostly upheaval. The
“territorial community test” that this Article introduces is an attempt
to meet that need.
A generation ago, in Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court recog3
nized a cause of action for political gerrymandering for the first time.
However, the standard the plurality announced, focusing on the “consistent[] degrad[ation] . . . of voters’ influence on the political process
4
as a whole,” proved hopelessly unworkable. Scholars puzzled over what
5
values the standard sought to capture, while lower courts struggled to
6
apply it in actual cases. A few years ago, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court
tackled gerrymandering again, with even worse results. A plurality
would have reversed Bandemer and declared the whole field nonjustici7
able. Three dissents proposed separate (and conflicting) approaches
8
for determining when gerrymanders cross the constitutional line. As
for Justice Kennedy, ever the Court’s agonist, he was unpersuaded by
the plurality, but also unpersuaded by any of the dissents, leaving him
(and us) in a limbo where a standard for identifying unlawful gerry9
manders might exist but has yet to be discovered.

3

478 U.S. 109, 113, 125 (1986) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 132.
5
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1684 (1993) (“Bandemer is a mass of confusion on
what the Court actually believes is the constitutional harm.”); Daniel Hays Lowenstein,
Bandemer’s Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING
AND THE COURTS 64, 74-77 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
6
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 282 (plurality opinion) (“In the lower courts, the legacy of the
plurality’s test [in Bandemer] is one long record of puzzlement and consternation.”).
7
See id. at 305-06.
8
See id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (proposing inquiry focused on partisan intent); id. at 346-52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (proposing burden-shifting approach imported from employment discrimination context); id. at 360-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing risk of “unjustified entrenchment” by political minority).
9
See id. at 316-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In the subsequent
case of League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC ) v. Perry, the Court explicitly
declined to answer any of the questions left hanging by Vieth. See 548 U.S. 399, 414
(2006) (“We do not revisit [Vieth’s] justiciability holding . . . .”). Unsurprisingly, the
scholarly response to Vieth has been sharply negative. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
397, 399 (2005); James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 643 (2004) (noting that “[t]he result [in Vieth] was
4

Stephanopoulos FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)4/9/2012 1:31 PM

2012]

Redistricting and the Territorial Community

1383

In the literature, as one might expect, potential approaches
abound for resolving political gerrymandering disputes. One important camp, led by Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, argues
that courts should emphasize electoral competition and intervene
10
when districts are deliberately drawn to be uncompetitive. Political
scientists such as Andrew Gelman, Bernard Grofman, and Gary King
have devised quantitative measures that show how fairly (or unfairly) a
11
given district plan treats the two major parties. Other scholars con12
tend that the judicial inquiry should center on partisan intent, dis13
14
trict compactness, the loss of democratic legitimacy, or a series of

disappointing” and “left the law a shambles”); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political
Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 528
(2004) (“[T]he Court at this moment seems to be at sea when deciding election law
cases.”); Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 627-28, 642 (2004); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth’s Gap: Has the Supreme Court Gone from Bad to Worse on Partisan
Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 368, 393-94 (2005).
10
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV.
593, 615-17 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where To Draw the Line?:
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 570-74 (2004); Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 680-81 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 262-63 (2006).
11
See, e.g., Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 514, 517-21 (1994); Bernard Grofman &
Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering
After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 6-9 (2007); Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship
Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV.
185, 195-200 (1985).
12
See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 82528 (2005); Briffault, supra note 9, at 416.
13
See, e.g., Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155, 1176-78
(1990); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 302, 32651 (1991); cf. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,”
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483, 536 (1993) (analyzing racial gerrymandering doctrine in compactness terms).
14
See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601,
607-16 (2007).
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factors derived from traditional districting criteria. Still other scholars assert that gerrymandering is not particularly harmful and should
16
not be dealt with by the courts at all.
As voluminous as this literature is, much of it favors approaches
that already have been spurned by the Court or that are in tension
with the principles underlying the American electoral system. For instance, an outright majority of the Vieth Court rejected Justice Stevens’s
partisan-intent standard, Justice Souter’s five-part test based on traditional districting criteria, and Justice Breyer’s minority-entrenchment
17
approach. Nor, despite repeated invitations, has the Court ever embraced competition as the linchpin of its election law jurisprudence;
indeed, even one of the dissenters in Vieth declined to adopt “[t]he
18
analogy to antitrust.” A competition-centered approach also would
be difficult to reconcile with the American commitment to geographic
districting, which intrinsically produces many uncompetitive constituencies. Similarly, quantitative measures of partisan fairness have been
19
appraised skeptically by the Court, and have limited relevance for a
districting regime that is organized around localized constituencies
rather than statewide seat and vote tallies.
In this Article, I present an approach for curbing political gerrymandering that promises to avoid some of these pitfalls. The approach, in brief, is that electoral districts should be required to

15

See, e.g., Gordon E. Baker, The “Totality of Circumstances” Approach, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 6, at 203, 205-10; Bernard Grofman,
Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 171-72 (1985).
16
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REV. 563, 577-78
(1989); Bruce E. Cain, Simple vs. Complex Criteria for Partisan Gerrymandering: A Comment
on Niemi and Grofman, 33 UCLA L. REV. 213, 225-26 (1985); Daniel H. Lowenstein &
Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or
Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 73-75 (1985); Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes
Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders,
116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 679-81 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan
Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1330, 1384
(1987).
17
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292-301 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 308
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with plurality’s criticisms of dissenters’ proposed standards); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 138-43 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (rejecting Justice Powell’s totality-of-circumstances approach).
18
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 350 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting).
19
See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 419-20 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
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correspond to underlying territorial communities. To the extent possible, the boundaries of districts and organic geographic communities
should be required to coincide—and the courts should be prepared to
intervene when communities are unnecessarily fused, fragmented, or
subverted, and the state can offer no reasonable explanation for the
communal disruption.
A few points of clarification: First, by “territorial community,” I
mean (1) a geographically defined group of people who (2) share similar social, cultural, and economic interests and (3) believe they are
part of the same coherent entity. Under this definition, territorial
communities sometimes, but not always, mirror political subdivisions
such as towns and counties. Territorial communities also are not quite
the same thing as “communities of interest” (a common term in the
redistricting case law), which are not necessarily geographically rooted
and can form on the basis of any shared concern. Rather, territorial
communities arise from the unique combinations of geography, interests, and identity that characterize particular places.
Second, district and community boundaries should coincide “to
the extent possible” because the one-person, one-vote rule makes perfect congruence impossible. When communities must be disrupted,
however, the disruption should be minimized—for instance, by joining
groups that are as similar in their interests and affiliations as is practicable. Third, “fusion” and “fragmentation” refer, respectively, to the
unnecessary merger of disparate communities and division of unified
communities. By “subversion,” I mean the drawing of districts that
diverge sharply from the defining characteristics of the larger communities in which they are located.
Lastly, when I say that the judiciary should be ready to “intervene,”
I primarily have in mind constitutional law as the source of the courts’
authority. But the power could, of course, be derived from other wellsprings, too: an act of Congress, state legislation, or, as I have dis20
cussed elsewhere, popular initiatives and referenda. I also do not
claim that adherence to community boundaries should be the sole criterion for determining whether a district plan is valid. My goal here is to

20

See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 332-37 (2007).
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call attention to an intriguing but underdeveloped doctrinal possibility—not to steal the thunder of other methods for combating gerrymandering.
Little in law is ever entirely new, but this territorial community test
clearly runs against the grain of contemporary scholarship. In three
recent articles, for example, Richard Briffault, Richard Hasen, and
Richard Pildes list an array of potential standards for political gerrymandering cases, but do not even mention adherence to community
21
boundaries as a possibility. When scholars have addressed the territor22
ial community, they typically have done so in cursory fashion and with
23
a hint of dismissiveness. As John Hart Ely once wrote, “‘[C]ommunity’
is a concept so squishy that we should hesitate to entrust its specific ap24
plication to either judges or politicians . . . .” Just about the only academics to delve into the subject at any length are Bernard Grofman
25
(who suggests that districts should be “cognizable” to voters), Henry
26
Chambers (who advocates “enclave districting”), and James Gardner
27
(who has researched state law on communities of interest).

21

See Briffault, supra note 9, at 418-21; Hasen, supra note 9, at 637-39; Richard H.
Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 66 (2004).
22
See, e.g., JEREMY BUCHMAN, DRAWING LINES IN QUICKSAND: COURTS, LEGISLATURES, & REDISTRICTING 204 (2003); BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE
63-66 (1984); Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the
Thicket at Last, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 215-16; Charles Backstrom et al., Establishing a
Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra
note 5, at 145, 153; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 577.
23
See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 607, 616 (1998); Richard L. Engstrom, The Post-2000 Round of Redistricting: An
Entangled Thicket Within the Federal System, PUBLIUS, Fall 2002, at 51, 66-67; Lowenstein &
Steinberg, supra note 16, at 32-33; Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A
Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1160-61 (2005).
24
Ely, supra note 23, at 616 (emphasis omitted).
25
See Grofman, supra note 15, at 90; Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have
Been Right if He Had Said: “When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn’t Everything, It’s the Only
Thing”?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1262-63 (1993).
26
See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Enclave Districting, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 135,
176-82 (1999).
27
See James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State
Constitutional Attempts To Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 894-97 (2006)
[hereinafter Gardner, Representation Without Party]; James A. Gardner, One Person, One
Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1241-46 (2002) [herein-
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The territorial community test thus bucks the academy’s conventional wisdom. What does it have going for it beyond its contrariness?
One significant (and previously unnoticed) advantage is that it has
been employed by the Supreme Court, at least implicitly, in a range of
recent redistricting decisions. In the racial gerrymandering context,
for example, districts that correspond to geographic communities
universally have been upheld by the Court, while districts that do not
invariably have been struck down. The Court’s reasoning is that districts coinciding with communities cannot have been crafted primarily
on the basis of race.
Similarly, in the realm of racial vote dilution, the Court’s governing standard asks whether a minority group is “geographically compact” and “politically cohesive”—in other words, whether the group is
28
a territorial community. In its most prominent recent dilution case,
the Court both objected to the breakup of an old district that contained a “cohesive and politically active Latino community,” and invalidated a new district that “combined two groups of Latinos, hundreds
29
of miles apart, that represent different communities.” It is notable
that the author of this decision was Justice Kennedy, the Hamlet of
Vieth. That he placed such weight on district-community congruence
indicates that he may be open to a similar approach in the political
gerrymandering arena.
A renewed emphasis on the territorial community also would be
consistent with the theory and historical practice of American districting. From colonial times until the reapportionment revolution of the
1960s, a core premise of American democracy was that communities
arise on the basis of geography, possess distinctive political interests,
and require representation in the legislature. Although this perspective has become less prevalent over the past two generations, it remains well-regarded among political theorists, and it dovetails nicely
with the enduring American commitment to geographic districting.
Consistent with this theory, the practice of most American jurisdic-

after Gardner, Possibility of Community]; James A. Gardner, What Is “Fair” Partisan Representation, and How Can It Be Constitutionalized? The Case for a Return to Fixed Election Districts, 90
MARQ. L. REV. 555, 578-82 (2007) [hereinafter Gardner, Fixed Election Districts].
28
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
29
LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 441 (2006).
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tions, over most of the country’s history, was to base representation at
least partly on the territorial community. At the state legislative level,
the most common constituency until the 1960s consisted of one or
more towns or counties. At the federal level, the county was typically
the building block for the congressional district.
The classic objection to the territorial community test is that it is
too difficult to determine where community boundaries are and
30
whether they coincide with district lines. The absence of “judicially
discernible and manageable standards,” of course, was the precise reason the Vieth plurality gave for rejecting all of the dissenters’ suggested
31
approaches. In my view, however, there are several reasons why the
test would actually be workable. First, the Court has shown repeatedly,
in the racial gerrymandering and racial vote dilution contexts, that it
can identify community boundaries and evaluate district-community
congruence. There is no reason why this task would be significantly
harder in the political gerrymandering context.
Second, an array of state courts already have done very nearly what I
propose: pursuant to state constitutional and statutory provisions, they
have resolved political gerrymandering disputes based on the degree to
which districts coincided with underlying communities. The rich body
of case law produced by these decisions—which scholars have largely
ignored—certainly does not seem arbitrary or unprincipled. Third, political scientists have developed several quantitative measures that could
be used to define communities and to assess how well districts correspond to them. Some measures employ socioeconomic data or people’s
own geographic affiliations to identify community boundaries. Other
techniques gauge the level of congruence between districts and political subdivisions or media markets, both of which are decent proxies
32
for geographic communities.
The second common criticism of the territorial community test is
that it would have undesirable political consequences. Skeptics claim
that it would harm Democrats and racial minorities (who supposedly

30

See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion).
32
In a sequel to this Article, I use newly available Census data as well as specialized
mapping software to identify geographic communities directly. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
31
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live in particularly concentrated communities) and make elections less
competitive. Concerns of this sort have limited bearing on the test’s
legal merit, and they turn out to be empirically unfounded as well. I
analyzed how partisan bias, electoral responsiveness, and minority representation differed during the last redistricting cycle between states
that paid heed to community boundaries when they redrew their dis33
trict maps and states that did not. I found that bias was markedly lower
in the community-respecting states (5.4% versus 9.4%), responsiveness
was markedly higher (1.43 versus 1.03), and minority representation
was essentially unchanged. These findings are largely confirmed by an
extensive political science literature—and suggest that the political
implications of the territorial community test’s adoption actually
would be quite positive.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth the theory of representation that justifies drawing electoral districts on the basis of territorial communities. Part II describes the tumultuous history of the
territorial community as a factor in redistricting practice and case law.
Part III considers how the territorial community test might translate
into doctrine. Part IV addresses concerns about the test’s judicial
manageability. Finally, Part V discusses the likely political consequences of tighter district-community congruence.
I. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Drawing district lines is no mere clerical task. To the contrary, the
way in which districts are delineated has profound implications for the
public’s engagement with politics, for the character of political representation, for electoral competition, and for partisan fairness. One
might even say that our democracy itself hinges, to some degree, on
34
our system of districting.

33

Partisan bias refers to the divergence in the share of seats that each party would
win given the same share of the statewide vote. Electoral responsiveness refers to the
rate at which a party gains or loses seats given changes in its statewide vote share. See
infra notes 76, 365-67 and accompanying text. A sequel to this Article also finds that
the political consequences of tighter district-community congruence are positive. See
Stephanopoulos, supra note 32 (manuscript at 31-35, 48-51).
34
See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 475-76 (2004) (noting that
redistricting “raises issues about the purpose and function of the [legislature], the value
of political competition, and how voters should be represented”).
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This means that no potential standard for drawing district lines (or
for thwarting political gerrymandering) can be evaluated properly
without taking into account its theoretical underpinnings. On what
theory of representation is the standard based? How compelling is this
theory? How consistent is it with the American democratic tradition?
In this Part, I outline the theory—that communities arise along geographic lines and should be represented in the legislature—in which
the territorial community test is rooted. I argue that this theory is plausible on its face and, more importantly, in harmony with the American
commitment to geographic districting (which I take here as a given). I
also contend that other prominent redistricting approaches either lack
a clear theoretical foundation or proceed from theories that cannot
easily be reconciled with core premises of American democracy.
Because this Article is more concerned with doctrinal matters than
with issues of democratic theory, this Part is relatively succinct. Still, in
the realm of redistricting, theory cannot be ignored—and, indeed,
35
warrants some discussion at the very outset.
A. The Underlying Theory
A distinct theory, which I call the theory of communal representa36
tion, underlies the territorial community test. The theory makes two
central claims. The first is that meaningful communities do in fact
develop on the basis of geography. Subjectively, people feel connected to (and affiliated with) other people who live close to them:
neighbors, members of the same school district, fellow residents in
town, other center-city dwellers, folks on this side of the mountains,
etc. Of course, powerful bonds can exist between people on opposite

35

See Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 418, 421 (1995) (reviewing LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994)) (arguing, in election law context, that “[t]he theoretical and the lawyerly are closely intertwined”).
36
As is evident from the many sources cited in this Section, this theory is not new.
But even though it is well-established, it is rarely set forth at length, and it is not associated with any specific thinker. Accordingly, there is value in clearly presenting the
theory’s central claims and consequences.
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corners of the globe, but proximity at least fosters a sense of subjective
37
solidarity.
Objectively, people who live nearby tend to have common interests. They may have similar income levels, educational backgrounds,
or housing situations. They may work for the same local employer or
industry. They may have moved to the area for related reasons: the
prevalence of certain cultural values, the availability of particular leisure pursuits, the presence of ethnic or racial compatriots, etc. Or
they may simply care about the effective governance of the place they
call home. Either way, the point is that people’s spatial closeness corr38
elates with, and helps generate, shared interests. As Gardner puts it,
“[P]eople who live in close physical proximity inevitably share certain
kinds of activities, and . . . the bonds created through these shared activities give rise to a community . . . that is deeply connected to, built
upon the matrix of, even induced by, the particular locality in which
39
the members live.”
The theory’s second claim is that territorial communities should be
represented as such in the legislature. They are important enough entities, capturing interests and values with sufficient political salience, that
they should serve as the basic building blocks of legislative representation. Geographic affinity—not party, race, profession, or any other fac-

37

See, e.g., NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, THE BLUE GUITAR: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
54 (1988); Alfange, supra note 22, at 216 (“Voters do identify with the
place in which they live, and do have a feeling of sharing concerns with others who live
in that place . . . .”); Charles H. Backstrom, Problems of Implementing Redistricting (“People
think of themselves as belonging together in counties in rural areas, in cities or sectors
of metropolitan areas, and in neighborhoods of central cities.”), in REPRESENTATION AND
REDISTRICTING ISSUES 43, 47 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982); Harold M. Proshansky
et al., Place Identity: Physical World Socialization of the Self (“Individuals do indeed define
who and what they are in terms of strong affective ties to . . . neighborhood and community.”), in GIVING PLACES MEANING 87, 91 (Linda Groat ed., 1995).
38
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 41 (“Many of the most important interests and concerns people have
relate to . . . their immediate geographic environment.”); Chambers, supra note 26, at
163 (“[P]eople who live in close proximity share similar political interests . . . .”); Benjamin Forest, Mapping Democracy: Racial Identity and the Quandary of Political Representation, 91 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 143, 157 (2001) (“[P]ropinquity is important
because political interests, preferences, and identity . . . are formed and defined by
local geographic communities . . . .”).
39
Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 950.
AND COMMUNITY
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tor—should be the criterion on the basis of which people are placed
into electoral districts. As Justice Stewart once wrote, elected officials
represent “people with identifiable needs and interests . . . which can
40
often be related to the geographical areas in which these people live.”
The significance of these “geographical areas”—territorial communities,
in this Article’s parlance—“carries with it an acceptance of the idea of
41
legislative representation of regional needs and interests.”
The theory of communal representation also has implications for
how districts should be constituted and how politicians should represent their constituents. First, if districts are drawn to coincide with
geographic communities, then they should be easily understandable
42
by voters—“cognizable,” to use Grofman’s term. Voters should be
less confused and more politically engaged when district boundaries
also demarcate groups of people with common interests and affilia43
tions. Second, districts should be relatively homogeneous in their
social, cultural, and economic complexions. When people who share
key attributes and who feel a kinship with one another are placed into
the same district, it follows that the district too should possess a com44
Not a perfectly uniform texture, since
paratively uniform texture.

40

Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
41
Id.; see also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 159 (1971) (discussing the “general
preference for legislatures reflecting community interests as closely as possible”);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 623-24 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[L]egislators
can represent their electors only by speaking for their interests . . . many of which do
reflect the place where the electors live.”); Briffault, supra note 35, at 431 (“[P]lacebased interests are the ones that ought to be guaranteed representation in the legislature.”); Gardner, Fixed Election Districts, supra note 27, at 574 (“[T]he interests that
ought to be represented in the legislature are those that are held in common by people
living in a particular place.”); C.O. Sauer, Geography and the Gerrymander, 12 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 403, 404-05 (1918).
42
Grofman, supra note 25, at 1262-63.
43
See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 173 n.13 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“Confusion inevitably follows . . . when a citizen finds
himself or herself forced to associate with several artificial communities . . . .”); BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 203 (“Plans that do not split [community] boundaries ostensibly
help voters identify their representatives, and vice versa.”); Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV. 227, 243 (1985).
44
See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 22, at 64 (“The argument that districts should not divide
communities . . . is in effect a plea for homogeneous districts.”); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR.,
HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 6 (1978) (“[T]he most homogene-
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there is often substantial diversity even within a single community,
but certainly a more consistent profile than a district that fuses together
unrelated groups of people.
Third, because of this homogeneity, it should be relatively straightforward for elected officials to identify and advance their districts’ interests. Representatives should be able fairly easily to become
“acquainted with the interests and circumstances of [their] constituents”—as Madison put it in The Federalist—when those traits are broadly
46
similar. In contrast, heterogeneous districts should pose a greater
representational challenge since they make it trickier both to discern
47
districts’ needs and to satisfy them effectively. Fourth, elected officials should tend toward the delegate side of the delegate-trustee spec48
trum of representation. Given coherent constituencies with distinct
interests, it should be simpler (and more electorally beneficial) for
officials to promote those interests than to exercise their own inde49
pendent discretion.

ous districts . . . incorporate pre-existing communities of interest.”); Richard Morrill, A
Geographer’s Perspective, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 5,
at 212, 216.
45
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 54 (“[C]ommunity . . . need not necessarily[]
mean ‘demographic homogeneity,’ sameness of social situation.”).
46
THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 346 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also MALCOLM E. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 115 (1982) (“In a
district that is basically homogeneous . . . the task of representation is relatively easy.”);
Chambers, supra note 26, at 149 (“A representative can most easily advance the interests of her constituency when those interests are clearly or narrowly defined.”).
47
See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 787 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“A
legislator cannot represent his constituents properly . . . when a voting district is nothing more than an artificial unit . . . .”); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863
(W.D. Wis. 1992) (“To be an effective representative, a legislator must represent a district that has a reasonable homogeneity of needs and interests . . . .”); CAIN, supra note
22, at 63-64; Chambers, supra note 26, at 149; Morrill, supra note 44, at 216.
48
According to the traditional delegate-trustee dichotomy, representatives who are
delegates abide by the expressed preferences of their constituents, while representatives who are trustees make their own autonomous policy decisions. See generally HANNA
FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144-67 (1967).
49
See, e.g., DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 71 (1992) (“[A] communities of interest
approach necessarily implies a delegate theory of representation.”); ROYCE HANSON,
THE POLITICAL THICKET: REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 130-31
(1966); SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 135; Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra
note 27, at 955-60.
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The theory’s final implication is that, while districts should be relatively homogeneous, the legislature should be relatively heterogene50
ous. With each community in the state (or nation) represented, the
legislature should reflect the full diversity of views held by the general
population—not just the preferences of the median voter. As John
Adams famously wrote, the legislature “should be an exact portrait, in
51
miniature, of the people at large.” On this view, legislative politics
should be inherently pluralistic, as varied communities jockey for position and negotiate over the formulation of public policy. Legislative
politics also should be less dominated by partisan cleavages, since party
affiliation presumably has lower salience in a system in which politicians identify strongly with entities (i.e., territorial communities) other
than political parties.
On balance, I find the theory’s two key claims—that territorial
communities exist and should be represented in the legislature—at
least plausible. While some politically salient interests do not correlate
with geography, many others plainly do, and it is sensible, in my view,
to capture these territorial concerns and assure them a legislative hearing. I also think the theory’s implications for districting and representation are relatively attractive. It does seem desirable for voters to be
able to make sense of their districts’ boundaries, for representatives to
be able to identify and promote their constituents’ interests, and for
legislatures to reflect accurately the diverse views of the public. In an

50

Heather Gerken has labeled this pattern of intra-district homogeneity and interdistrict heterogeneity as “second-order diversity.” Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1107-08 (2005). Of course, even under this approach,
only views that are held by sufficiently large and geographically defined groups of people will be represented in the legislature.
51
Letter from John Adams to John Penn ( Jan. 1776), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS
OF JOHN ADAMS 491, 493 (George W. Carey ed., 2000); see also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing for “effective
representation in the State’s legislature . . . of the various groups and interests making
up the electorate”); J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 184 (1966) (“[T]he representative Assembly must be
merely a small-scale replica of the whole people, drawn directly from it and reproducing it without the slightest distortion.”); Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of
Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252, 277 (“[T]he general interest, and the innumerable separate interests of which it is composed, will be better expressed in a medley of voices
from minor fractions of the population than by any monolithic majority.”).
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era riven by partisanship, it is also hard to quarrel with an approach
that might weaken the grip of political parties.
Much more could be said, of course, about the theory of communal representation. In this Article, however, I am less interested in
fleshing out the theory than in pointing out that it is consistent with—
and arguably compelled by—the American commitment to geographic
districting. This commitment, as many scholars have noted (often in
52
53
frustration), is ironclad and dates all the way back to the Framing.
With very few exceptions, American jurisdictions have always elected
representatives from geographically defined constituencies. At times,
jurisdictions have used at-large elections, multimember districts, and
even voting rules other than first-past-the-post, but almost always in the
context of districts that were spatially demarcated. There are also no
signs that this practice is likely to change anytime soon. As Peter
Schuck has observed, geographic districting “remains a firmly embedded feature of American political life, one that reformers’ criticisms
54
have utterly failed to dislodge.”
Given the premise of geographic districting (which this Article does
55
not challenge ), the theory that territorial communities should be rep-

52

See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 41-43 (1988); ANNE PHILLIPS, ENGENDERING
DEMOCRACY 63 (1991) (discussing “near universal practice of electing representatives
according to geographical constituencies”); ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN 56 (2005) (“[T]erritorial districting in the United States is such a habit of mind
that it is not seriously challenged . . . .”); Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and RaceConscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1603-05 (1993);
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 483 (noting “long-standing Anglo-American commitment to organizing political representation around geography”).
53
See Polsby & Popper, supra note 13, at 307 n.29 (“[T]he Founders valued the
faction-diluting character of representation by place. . . . [T]he authors of the Constitution deliberately chose geographical representation.”); James Thomas Tucker, Redefining American Democracy: Do Alternative Voting Systems Capture the True Meaning of
“Representation”?, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 357, 369 (2002) (“[T]he Constitutional Framers
intended that Representatives be elected from [geographic] districts.”).
54
Schuck, supra note 16, at 1360.
55
I agree with many of the critiques of geographic districting: that people’s interests are often non-territorial, that it can produce unfair electoral outcomes (especially in
combination with plurality voting and single-member districts), that other systems are
better at reflecting the public’s views, etc. In this Article, however, I take geographic
districting as a given. My goal here is only to explore how political gerrymandering can
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resented in the legislature follows fairly naturally. If district lines are to
be drawn on the basis of geography, those lines must correspond to
something, and there are few candidates for what that something should
be other than people’s territorially linked interests and affiliations. Certainly, it would not be sensible to draw spatial boundaries at random, or
in order to create pretty shapes on a map, or to unite people who have
no geographic connection to one another. Districting based on geography (rather than party, race, profession, or any of the other myriad
possibilities) entails districting based on the value that geography is
meant to capture. And that value is adherence to the territorial community—and it is hard to see how it could be anything else. In the
words of one political theorist, “[T]he claim for geographic [districting] . . . usu-ally rests . . . on some concept of community, on the rela56
tionships among people living in relative proximity to one another.”
There is a lively academic debate as to whether territorial communities are as meaningful today as they once were. Some scholars assert
that advances in transportation and telecommunications, combined
with the public’s greater mobility and social fluidity, have undermined
57
all geographic groupings. In contrast, other observers contend that
people continue to have a “deep concern for [their] locality or region”
and a “fundamental desire . . . for a sense of place, [for] belonging to

be curbed in a manner consistent with the practice and underlying theory of geographic
districting. The debate over geographic districting itself I leave for another day.
56
ELAINE SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 52 (1984); see also BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 197
(discussing “the assumed linkage between geography and politically salient interests
that conceptually underpins a reliance on district-based elections”); Gardner, Fixed
Election Districts, supra note 27, at 584 (“[T]erritorial representation . . . must rest on the
fact that the residents of represented territories comprise distinct and coherent local
communities . . . .”); Guinier, supra note 52, at 1610-12; Timothy G. O’Rourke, Shaw v.
Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 723, 770 (1995) (“[T]he commitment to geographic districting requires . . . the creation of districts that . . . constitute
identifiable constituencies.”).
I can think of one value other than adherence to the territorial community that
geographic districting might plausibly aim to capture: administrability. But while geographically demarcated districts are indeed easily administrable, so too are non-spatial
districts, particularly given the rise of modern information technology.
57
See, e.g., BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 160; MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST,
AND MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION
73 (1998); T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 637 (1993); Gardner, Possibility of Community, supra note 27, at 1261-62.
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58

a community.” On this account, recent developments have not undercut territorial communities, but rather increased their appeal for the
atomized inhabitants of the modern world.
This Article is not the place for me to venture into this controversy.
My claim, rather, is that whether or not the importance of territorial
communities has waned, they ought to remain the focus of districting
as long as it is carried out geographically. If territorial communities
indeed no longer matter to people, then perhaps it is time for America
to abandon geographic districting. But as long as districts continue to
be drawn along spatial lines, I see no theoretically justifiable alternative to drawing them to correspond to territorial communities (weakened though they may be). Territorial communities remain the only
game in town.
B. Other Approaches
There are, of course, many possible ways to combat political gerrymandering other than by requiring district-community congruence.
To cite some of the most prominent options, traditional districting
criteria such as compactness could be enforced more stringently, highly
uncompetitive districts could be invalidated, or statewide measures of
59
partisan fairness could be applied. There is much to like about these
approaches, and any of them would represent a marked improvement
over the status quo. Here, though, I am interested in evaluating the
theoretical underpinnings of redistricting standards. And on this criterion, none of the above options is entirely satisfying. The first lacks a
clear theoretical foundation, while the others are based on theories

58

RICHARD L. MORRILL, POLITICAL REDISTRICTING AND GEOGRAPHIC THEORY 63
(1981); see also BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 5 (2008) (arguing that Americans now “cluster[] in
communities of sameness, among people with similar ways of life, beliefs, and, in the
end, politics”); Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L.
REV. 843, 914 (1999) (“Even in the highly urban, industrialized and culturally polyglot
societies of the Western capitalist democracies, the assertion of organic cultural community is appealing.”); David B. Knight, Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on
Nationalism and Regionalism, 72 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 514, 526 (1982).
59
See Briffault, supra note 9, at 400-02 (listing possible gerrymandering standards);
Hasen, supra note 9, at 637-39 (same); Pildes, supra note 21, at 66-74 (same).
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that are not easy to square with basic assumptions of the American
electoral system.
1. Compactness
Beginning with compactness, there is no reason to think that people are represented adequately only when they are placed in districts
whose shapes are aesthetically pleasing. No theory holds that people’s
engagement with the political process, the relationships between constituents and their elected officials, or politicians’ performance in office, is optimal in a regime where districts are compact. Neither the
jaggedness of districts’ boundaries, nor the dispersion of their territor60
ies, has any inherent connection to the caliber of districts’ political
life. As Robert Dixon has noted, “Shape requirements focus on form
61
rather than the substance of effective political representation.”
Claims are occasionally advanced that compact districts facilitate
communication between constituents and representatives, improve
62
voters’ knowledge of elected officials, or convey political legitimacy.
But it should be obvious that compactness itself does not necessarily
produce these benefits. A district may be a perfect circle, but have a
mountain range running down the middle of it, or combine two towns
63
with nothing in common. In these (and many other) cases, attractive

60

The regularity of a district’s perimeter and the dispersion of a district’s area are
two well-established measures of compactness. See BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 200;
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 554-56.
61
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts,
in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES, supra note 37, at 7, 16; see also Shaw v.
Hunt (Shaw II ), 517 U.S. 899, 936 n.13 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (positing that
voters’ “interest in being in a district whose members share similar interests and concerns . . . often is not[] vindicated by drawing districts with attractive shapes”); MARK
MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS AND BULLWINKLES: HOW POLITICIANS MANIPULATE ELECTRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS 71 (2001); Grofman, supra note 15,
at 89-90 (“[T]he usefulness of requiring that districts be compact has been vastly overrated.”); Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 1693 (noting “absence of an independent normative foundation for a compactness requirement”).
62
See, e.g., BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 198; BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 49, at 72-73;
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 538 n.177.
63
See Persily, supra note 23, at 1158 (“One could draw compact districts that group
unrelated communities on different sides of a mountain or river . . . .”). Conversely, noncompact districts may sometimes correspond to territorial communities and be cognizable
to voters. See Briffault, supra note 38, at 44 n.104; Grofman, supra note 25, at 1263.

Stephanopoulos FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)4/9/2012 1:31 PM

2012]

Redistricting and the Territorial Community

1399

district shape is not correlated with good communication, high voter
knowledge, or enhanced legitimacy. Moreover, when compactness is
correlated with these attributes, it is often because the compact district
corresponds to a compact territorial community. Within a community,
of course, it is relatively easy for voters and elected officials to communicate and for constituents to inform themselves about their representatives. Districts that reflect underlying communities are also
usually perceived as politically legitimate. Accordingly, there is no
theoretical basis for focusing on compact districts—whose principal
appeal is that they are weak proxies for territorial communities—
64
instead of on the communities themselves.
2. Competition
As compactness has lost some of its luster in recent years, scholars
have turned their attention to the argument (most associated with Issacharoff and Pildes) that courts should prioritize structural values in
65
election law cases, electoral competition chief among them. In the
redistricting context, this argument means that highly uncompetitive
districts should be invalidated (or at least regarded with severe skepti66
cism), particularly when the lack of competition is deliberate. As its
advocates make clear, a particular theory of democracy underlies this
approach. “[D]emocratic politics [is] akin in important respects to a
robustly competitive market . . . . Only through an appropriately com-

64

See Grofman, supra note 15, at 92 (arguing that compactness is “a useful criterion
only to the extent that it happens to coincide with other features”); Pildes & Niemi,
supra note 13, at 538 (“[C]ompactness might be associated with relevant substantive
districting values, like preserving communities that shared common political interests,
but . . . compactness [is] a poor proxy for those values.”). The other common argument for compactness is instrumental: imposing an additional constraint on linedrawers makes it more difficult for them to pursue partisan advantage or incumbent
protection. See, e.g., Polsby & Popper, supra note 13, at 332 (“[W]here compactness is a
constraint, a gerrymanderer’s job is noticeably harder.”). This argument plainly is not
based on any theory of representation. Moreover, there is reason to doubt that compactness is a meaningful constraint for redistricters, see Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra
note 16, at 22-23, and similar indirect limitations can be imposed in other ways—such
as through adherence to territorial communities.
65
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
66
See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 620 (arguing that bipartisan gerrymanders
should be presumptively invalid); Pildes, supra note 10, at 271-76.
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petitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of democratic politics be realized: that the policy outcomes of the political
67
process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens.” In other
words, competition is the essence of democracy, because it is only
through competition that the government becomes responsive and
accountable to voters.
This is a compelling conception, and it has significant (and largely
positive) implications for how courts should tackle an array of election
68
law controversies. In the redistricting realm, though, the theory runs
into some difficulty. The problem that is particularly relevant here
(and that has received little attention in the literature) is the tension
between the theory and the American commitment to geographic districting. Different geographic areas, of course, have different political
profiles. In some areas (e.g., blue-collar ethnic communities, certain
suburbs), the two major parties enjoy similar levels of support. But in
other areas (e.g., rural farmland, urban centers), one party is far more
popular than the other. In this latter category of places, it is extremely
difficult to design competitive districts. Any district that accurately
reflects the area’s politics inevitably will be safe for one party or another.
The only way to create a swing district is to fuse part of one area (a
center city, say) with part of another (for instance, a faraway farming
69
community).
The conflict between the competition-centered approach and geographic districting thus arises because many geographic areas simply
are not politically competitive. In these areas, either uncompetitive

67

Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 10, at 646; see also Issacharoff, supra note 10, at
623 (“[D]emocracy is defined primarily by the accountability of the elected to the electors, an accountability that is in turn shaped through competitive elections.”); Richard
H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 685, 688
(2004) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)).
68
See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 10, at 652-87 (applying competitioncentered approach to White Primary Cases, write-in ballots, and fusion candidacies);
Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1613-15 (1999)
(applying approach to threshold vote requirements for parties in proportional representation systems).
69
See Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP.
CT. REV. 409, 425 (2004) (“[I]n places where there are . . . politically homogeneous
groups of voters, there may be no reasonable redistricting arrangement that is capable
of . . . produc[ing] competitive general elections.”).
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districts must be drawn—despite the harms that allegedly ensue for
democratic responsiveness and accountability—or competitive districts
must be created by connecting groups of people with little in common. Surprisingly, advocates of the competition-centered approach
do not appear to favor the latter option. Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan write that “[t]here will always be Berkeley and Orange
County,” where “[i]t would take a radical gerrymander . . . to bring
70
them to a contested balance between the major parties.” Richard
Pildes similarly distinguishes between “safe districts that arise naturally”
and “safe districts that arise because political insiders have grossly mani71
pulated district designs.”
But if competitiveness can be sacrificed wherever it does not develop organically, then the competition-centered approach is not all
that different from this Article’s call for district-community congruence. In that case, both approaches recommend competitive districts
where the broader community is competitive, and uncompetitive districts where the broader community is uncompetitive. Likewise, both
approaches condemn uncompetitive districts that are drawn within a
competitive community—on one account because responsiveness and
accountability are needlessly undermined, and on the other because a
coherent community is needlessly disrupted.
This may seem like an elegant theoretical convergence, but it is actually more akin to a surrender. The logical implication of the competition-centered approach is that competitive districts indeed should be
drawn, where necessary, by merging disparate communities. By resisting this implication, the approach’s proponents concede that the
principle of adherence to territorial communities takes precedence
over their desire for competitive districts. They concede (to quote Issacharoff and Karlan) that “there is . . . normative force to the idea that
72
districts should reflect some reality on the ground.”

70

Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 574; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Surreply,
Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 692 (2002) (“There will always be a Utah and a
Massachusetts. The question is not whether districts should be homogenized . . . but
whether districts may be rigged so as to diminish or eliminate competition that would
otherwise emerge . . . .”).
71
Pildes, supra note 10, at 266.
72
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 552.
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If advocates of the competition-centered approach did not make
this concession—that is, if they insisted on competitive districts under
all circumstances—then their goals would be met most readily by non73
territorial constituencies. Districts defined by their balanced partisan
composition (rather than by their spatial boundaries) are the obvious
way to maximize electoral competitiveness. But even if such a district74
ing regime were attractive in the abstract, it would bear little resemblance to our actual system. We would have to renounce our
commitment to territoriality in order to optimize political competition, because geographic districts cannot fully accommodate nongeographic values.75
3. Partisan Fairness
The final approach that is often recommended for curbing political gerrymandering is some quantitative measure of partisan fairness.
For instance, the partisan symmetry test (the most sophisticated of these
measures) focuses on whether each major party would win the same
share of seats given a particular share of the statewide vote. The disjunction, if any, between the seat shares—e.g., if Democrats would win
sixty percent of the seats if they received fifty percent of the votes, but
Republicans would win sixty-five percent of the seats with that vote
76
share—constitutes the partisan asymmetry. The theory underlying

73

See, e.g., REHFELD, supra note 52, at 177 (endorsing non-territorial districts that
each resemble the nation as a whole); Pamela S. Karlan, A Bigger Picture (commenting
that since “many citizens’ most pressing interests . . . are not primarily defined by where
they live . . . we probably would pick a different system if we were starting from scratch”),
in REFLECTING ALL OF US: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 73, 74-76
( Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999).
74
For a powerful critique of such a regime, see generally Persily, supra note 16.
75
See Gardner, Fixed Election Districts, supra note 27, at 572-73 (“[P]artisan competition and territorial districting . . . are conflicting and indeed incommensurable principles upon which to base a system of legislative representation.”); cf. Michael P.
McDonald, Redistricting and Competitive Districts (noting that in Arizona, where competitiveness is a redistricting criterion, competitive districts often can be drawn only by
“placing dissimilar communities together”), in THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY:
ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 222, 239 (Michael P. McDonald &
John Samples eds., 2006).
76
See Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 6-9. A cruder approach would simply ask
whether a party receives the same share of seats and votes. This is another way of asking
whether representation is proportional—clearly a value that is inconsistent with geo-
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this approach is clear: “[T]he electoral system [should] treat similarly77
situated parties equally,” so that “candidates of each political party . . . have equal opportunity in translating voter support into the divi78
sion of legislative seats between the parties.”
This theory too is appealing in principle but difficult to square
with the practice of geographic districting. Given the different political profiles of different areas, there is little reason to think that districts drawn on the basis of geographic considerations will typically
yield the same results for both major parties. For example, one party’s
support in a state might be heavily concentrated while the other party’s
backers are more evenly (and effectively) dispersed. In this case, the
parties would not win the same share of seats given a particular share
of the statewide vote—at least not as long as districts are drawn on the
79
basis of the usual redistricting criteria. It might be possible to devise
districts that ensure partisan symmetry in such a state, but these districts would likely form strange shapes and pay little heed to subdivi80
sion or community boundaries. If constituencies are to be defined
not just spatially, but also in accordance with underlying geographic
81
realities, then partisan symmetry cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the
best way to ensure symmetry is to adopt a non-territorial electoral sys-

graphic districting. See Alfange, supra note 22, at 221-22; Schuck, supra note 16, at 136177.
77
Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 6.
78
Id. at 8.
79
See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“The existence
or degree of asymmetry may in large part depend on conjecture about where possible
vote-switchers will reside.”); CAIN, supra note 22, at 75 (“If there are enclaves of homogeneous support for one or the other party, then it will be necessary to distinguish
between partisan inefficiency caused by residential segregation and that caused by
redistricting per se.”).
80
See Alfange, supra note 22, at 223 (“To achieve [partisan symmetry] in a districting
system, it would probably be necessary to engage in a process of reverse gerrymandering,
creating meandering districts that violate the compactness criterion . . . .”); cf. Jenni
Newton-Farrelly, From Gerry-Built to Purpose-Built: Drawing Electoral Boundaries for Unbiased
Election Outcomes, 45 REPRESENTATION 471, 476 (2009) (U.K.) (noting that in South
Australia, the only jurisdiction in the world with an explicit partisan fairness requirement, “geographic districts . . . [are] split where required by fairness or equity”).
81
See Gardner, Fixed Election Districts, supra note 27, at 576 (“[O]ur ability to achieve
fair partisan representation is consistently thwarted by our commitment to territorial
representation.”); Grofman & King, supra note 11, at 29 (conceding that “partisan bias
[can be] necessitated by the state’s compliance with neutral districting principles”).
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tem—proportional representation, for instance, which intrinsically
treats all major parties identically.
The inherent symmetry of non-territorial regimes points to the
core problem with applying metrics of partisan fairness to American
elections: those metrics look only to statewide shares of seats and votes,
while the character of geographic districting is irreducibly local. As
discussed above, the very reason for drawing geographic districts is to
capture something unique about each particular place—to enable
each distinct locality to have its voice heard (and its interests ad82
vanced) in the legislature. Under this conception of representation,
concerns about statewide seats and votes are largely irrelevant. What
matters, instead, is that each district make sense (because it corresponds to a territorial community), not that the consolidated votes in
all the districts across the state bear some relationship to the seats controlled statewide by each party. As Justice O’Connor once noted,
“[V]oters cast votes for candidates in their districts, not for a statewide
slate of legislative candidates . . . . Consequently, efforts to determine
party voting strength presuppose a norm that does not exist—
83
statewide elections for representatives along party lines.”
Accordingly, the principal alternatives to the territorial community
test are theoretically problematic. While preferable to the status quo
and appealing in many respects, they either lack an appropriate theoretical foundation or conflict with the enduring American commitment to geographic districting.
II. THE ARC OF HISTORY
It is not only theory that demands consideration in the redistricting context. History, too, has important implications for which approaches to political gerrymandering can and should be adopted.
That a particular approach has long been used by many American jurisdictions suggests that it fits well with our electoral institutions and

82

See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 159 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also
Alfange, supra note 22, at 224 (“Individual [district] elections are often intensely personal matters, turning not in the slightest degree on which party the voter wants to
control the legislature . . . . It just cannot be assumed that a vote for a particular candidate in a particular district is a vote for that candidate’s party statewide.”).
83
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84

values. Conversely, there is greater uncertainty associated with standards that rarely or never have been employed (such as competitiveness
and partisan fairness). The ecosystem of election law is intricate, and
it is difficult to predict what consequences new seedlings might have.
Accordingly, this Part examines the rich history of the territorial
community in American redistricting practice and doctrine. I first discuss the period prior to the reapportionment revolution, during which
districts generally corresponded to communities and gerrymandering
was understood as the absence of such congruence. I next explain
how the momentous one-person, one-vote decisions of the 1960s dethroned the territorial community and replaced it with a singleminded focus on population equality. Lastly, in what is this Part’s
most novel contribution to the literature, I argue that respect for territorial communities has returned to the fore in recent years. State
courts often focus on adherence to community boundaries when they
evaluate district plans, and the Supreme Court’s intuition that districts
and communities should coincide now animates—and gives coherence
to—a good deal of its redistricting case law. Rumors of the territorial
community’s demise, like Mark Twain’s, seem to have been greatly
exaggerated.
A. Ascendance
Almost since the inception of Anglo-American democracy, electoral districts and territorial communities usually have coincided.
More than seven hundred years ago, when England’s House of Commons came into being, it was geographic communities that received
representation. Counties, shires, and boroughs all sent delegates to
inform the monarch of their views and to promote their particular interests. Because it was distinct localities that were represented, rather
than the public at large, it was “more accurate to call the representa-

84

Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 308 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (expressing interest in learning more about “principles of fair districting
discussed in the annals of parliamentary or legislative bodies” in order to determine
“well-accepted rules of fairness that should govern districting”).
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tive portion of the Parliament a House of Communes than a House of
85
Commons.”
Colonial America adopted a similar model. In all thirteen colonies, local communities (such as towns, counties, plantations, and parishes) directly elected representatives to the various assemblies.
Though more populous communities were sometimes assigned more
elected officials, representation was always provided to some commu86
nal unit. After independence, states continued to organize their politics around the territorial community. Their original constitutions all
designated towns (in New England) or counties (everywhere else) as
the entities from which representatives were to be elected to the state
87
legislature. “[T]he basic unit of legislative representation was widely
understood throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to be
88
the [town or] county.”
As time passed and the country grew, a number of states switched
from town or county representation to electoral districts drawn roughly on the basis of population. According to Gardner’s survey of state

85

A.H. BIRCH, REPRESENTATION 27 (1971); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 307
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (referring to “the basic English principle of apportioning representatives among the local governmental entities . . . rather than among
units of approximately equal population”); GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT
REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 15-16
(1966); JOHN C. COURTNEY, COMMISSIONED RIDINGS: DESIGNING CANADA’S ELECTORAL
DISTRICTS 206 (2001) (“[T]he House of Commons was originally the House of Communitates, the counties and boroughs of England.”); ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS
OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776–1850, at 37 (1987) (“[E]ach
community sent a designated number of delegates to the House of Commons.”).
86
See Gardner, Possibility of Community, supra note 27, at 1244-45; see also Baker, 369
U.S. at 307 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that British approach “had early taken
root in the colonies”); GORDON E. BAKER, RURAL VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL POWER 7
(1955); HOWARD BALL, THE WARREN COURT’S CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY: AN EVALUATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S APPORTIONMENT OPINIONS 52 (1971); REHFELD,
supra note 52, at 72-77; Guinier, supra note 52, at 1604-05 (“This link between political
representation and . . . geographic ties was later carried over to the United States during the Colonial period.”); Tucker, supra note 53, at 366-69.
87
See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN
LAW AND POLITICS 62-63 (1968) (listing apportionment methods of original thirteen
states); ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 30-31
(1907). For their upper houses, about half the states elected senators from individual
counties, while the other half elected them from districts composed of multiple whole
counties. See DIXON, supra, at 62; Tucker, supra note 53, at 367-68.
88
Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 918.
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constitutions, this trend took hold at the state senate level around
89
1800, and at the state house level around 1850. Rosemarie Zagarri
reports that it was mostly the larger and newer states that switched to
90
districted elections in the 1800s. Crucially, these state legislative districts, unlike their modern analogues, almost never disrupted town or
county boundaries. To the contrary, state constitutions frequently
prohibited districts from dividing political subdivisions, and occasion91
ally defined districts outright as combinations of smaller subunits. At
the federal level too, congressional districts in the 1800s typically were
composed of whole towns and counties and rarely crossed their
92
boundaries. In this era, the “principle that local government units
should be kept intact for purposes of representation” was “almost uni93
versally accepted” for both state and federal elections.
This regime endured mostly unchanged through the first half of
the twentieth century. In 1955, on the eve of the reapportionment
revolution, nine states still elected at least one chamber purely by town
94
or by county. Only twelve states required districts to be drawn solely
95
on the basis of population. The “most common practice” was to allocate representatives to state legislative districts, composed of one or
more whole counties, in “rough proportion to their respective popula96
Most congressional districts also continued to respect the
tions.”

89

Id. at 900-02.
See ZAGARRI, supra note 85, at 57-59; see also BAKER, supra note 85, at 20-21; DIXON,
supra note 87, at 66-70 (observing that newer midwestern and western states typically
used districts but also often guaranteed at least one representative for each county and
barred districts from dividing counties).
91
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 311 n.85 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Gardner, Representation
Without Party, supra note 27, at 914-15 (“At no time before the [reapportionment revolution] did state constitutions authorize the creation of . . . districts that crossed local
government boundaries.”); Micah Altman, Districting Principles and Democratic Representation 130-32 (Mar. 31, 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, California Institute
of Technology), available at http://www.box.com/shared/ng2te8r03xd0y32ab262.
92
See MONMONIER, supra note 61, at 4; Micah Altman, Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 SOC. SCI. HIST. 159, 168-71 (1998) (analyzing congressional districts’ correspondence to political subdivisions throughout U.S. history); Altman, supra note 91, at 150-51, 163 n.112 (same).
93
Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 914.
94
BAKER, supra note 86, at 11.
95
Id. at 12; DIXON, supra note 87, at 76-77.
96
Gardner, Fixed Election Districts, supra note 27, at 578.
90
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boundaries of political subdivisions (though the number of infractions
97
inched higher). Just before the Supreme Court entered the fray,
then, representation in America largely remained as it had always
been: founded first on districts that kept territorial communities intact, and only afterward on the concept of equal district population.
Not surprisingly, the reason why American representation took this
form prior to the 1960s was that Americans tended to accept the theory of communal representation (discussed above in Part I). By and
large, that is, American jurisdictions agreed that territorial communities existed and ought to be represented as such in the legislature.
Gordon Baker notes that electoral arrangements in this period “reflect[ed] . . . the force of localism, the view that every community
should have . . . a distinct and substantial[] voice in the state legisla98
ture.” Similarly, state courts often explained their commitment to
districts that respected community boundaries by waxing eloquent
99
about the “common interests and objects” of each county’s residents,
100
“the community of interests in the respective counties,” and the
“right” of counties “to be represented by their own members of the leg101
It was thus no coincidence that districts usually coincided
islature.”
with territorial communities in this era; rather, this was the natural result of the theory of representation to which most Americans adhered.
Under this theory, gerrymandering was conceived as not only the
undue pursuit of political advantage, but also the disruption of organic
geographic communities. The original Massachusetts gerrymander of

97

See Altman, supra note 92, at 181 fig.7; Tucker, supra note 53, at 376.
BAKER, supra note 85, at 27; see also REHFELD, supra note 52, at 57; JOHN PHILLIP
REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
133 (1989) (arguing that American system of representation was based on “the local
necessity, the local advantage, the benefit of local representatives . . . who knew the electors, their circumstances, needs, and desires”); Gardner, Representation Without Party,
supra note 27, at 936, 939 (describing “fixture in American political thought” that “inhabitants of a county or town . . . comprise a community,” which “justif[ies] the constitutional designation of local governments . . . as the fundamental units of legislative
representation”).
99
Denney v. State ex rel. Basler, 42 N.E. 929, 937 (Ind. 1896).
100
Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105, 108 (Va. 1932).
101
State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 730 (Wis. 1892); see also
People ex rel. Baird v. Bd. of Supervisors, 33 N.E. 827, 830 (N.Y. 1893) (discussing “certain community of interest among the inhabitants of a county”).
98
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1812 provoked such ire (according to a scholar writing in 1907) because “[t]owns were separated and single towns were isolated from
102
their proper counties.” Another early twentieth-century observer defined gerrymandering as “a violation of the geographic unity of regions,” with “[t]he amount of divergence of electoral boundaries from
103
geographic boundaries” serving as “a measure of their fairness.”
Consistent with this definition, many states prohibited districts from
dividing territorial communities. The first such ban was adopted by
Pennsylvania in 1790, and the idea eventually became one of the most
common state constitutional techniques for combating gerrymander104
ing. As the Indiana Supreme Court explained in 1892, by “prohibiting the division of counties in the formation of . . . districts,” the state
constitution’s drafters “intended to put it beyond the power of the
105
general assembly” to engage in gerrymandering.
B. Decline and Fall
This coherent conception of representation—in which districts
corresponded to territorial communities and gerrymandering was understood as the absence of such congruence—came under fierce attack
during the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s. In a series of
landmark decisions, the Supreme Court held that reapportionment

102

GRIFFITH, supra note 87, at 17; see also POLE, supra note 51, at 247 (noting that in
Massachusetts “old connections had been sundered” and “[g]enuine ‘interests’ had
been divided”); James A. Gardner, Wandering Lonely as a Cloud: National Citizenship and
the Case for Non-Territorial Election Districts, 5 ELECTION L.J. 210, 211 (2006) (reviewing
REHFELD, supra note 52)(explaining that 1812 Massachusetts gerrymander was “shocking” because “it conspicuously flouted . . . county boundaries”).
103
Sauer, supra note 41, at 404-05. Sauer examined districts in Kentucky, Missouri,
and Tennessee and identified several gerrymanders under his definition. One district
in Missouri, for example, “pair[ed] the cotton farmer of the Southeastern Lowlands
with the native of the remote White River hills in Stone and Taney counties, most
Ozarkian of the Ozarks. A more ill-matched group would be hard to find.” Id. at 413.
104
See Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 916-20; see also GRIFFITH, supra note 87, at 95-97, 111-13, 123 (noting several states that adopted ban on
division of communities).
105
Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 32 N.E. 836, 842 (Ind. 1892); see also Cunningham,
51 N.W. at 730 (ruling district plan invalid in part because of “breaking up of the lines
and boundaries of counties by the new assembly districts”).
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106

disputes are justiciable, and that the one-person, one-vote rule
(which requires districts to have the same population) applies to fed107
108
109
eral, state, and local elections. Crucially, the Court refused to
relax the one-person, one-vote rule so that district and community
boundaries could continue to coincide. Instead, the Court insisted on
near-perfect district equipopulation even at the cost of widespread
community disruption.
In the foundational 1964 case of Reynolds v. Sims, for instance, the
Court rejected the argument that some discrepancies in district population could be justified by a jurisdiction’s policy of keeping communities intact. The Court asserted that political subdivisions are merely
“subordinate governmental instrumentalities” and that “[l]egislators
110
are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.”
Community-oriented “[c]onsiderations of area” were therefore “an
insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population prin111
ciple.” Similarly, in the 1969 case of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, the Court
invalidated a Missouri district plan whose population variances (of less
than four percent) were motivated by “regard for such factors as the
representation of distinct interest groups [and] the integrity of county
112
The Court declared that “to accept population variances,
lines.”
large or small, in order to create districts with specific interest orienta113
tions is antithetical to . . . the constitutional command.”

106

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88, 237 (1962).
See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1964).
108
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
109
See Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 476, 485-86 (1968).
110
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562, 575.
111
Id. at 580; see also id. at 579-80 (“[N]either history alone, nor economic or other
sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from
population-based representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes.”
(footnote omitted)).
112
394 U.S. 526, 528-30 (1969).
113
Id. at 533; see also Alfange, supra note 22, at 197 (“Kirkpatrick’s message to the
gerrymanderer was clear: there is absolutely no reason to be hesitant about splitting
communities among various districts . . . .”). Other Supreme Court cases in the 1960s
reinforced Kirkpatrick’s message. See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1969)
(invalidating New York congressional plan that tried to “keep regions with distinct interests intact”); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 122-23 (1967) (per curiam) (invalidating
Texas congressional plan that “resulted from a bona fide attempt . . . to respect county
boundaries”); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686, 691-93 (1964) (invalidating Virginia
107
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Perhaps the most striking example of the Court’s preoccupation
with the one-person, one-vote rule, no matter what the communal cost,
114
came in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly. In this 1964 case, Colorado’s voters decisively rejected an initiative that would have reapportioned both houses of the state legislature solely on the basis of
115
population. Instead, majorities in every county endorsed a rival initiative that would have reapportioned the state house based only on population, and the state senate based on both population and “a variety of
116
geographical, historical, topographic and economic considerations.”
117
The Court nevertheless struck down the voters’ preferred plan. It was
irrelevant to the Court that the plan’s population deviations were quite
small, that they were the product of “geography, . . . accessibility, observance of natural boundaries, and conformity to historical divisions”—and even that they had been approved by the very voters whose
118
rights the Court held had been violated.
Not surprisingly, the dissenters in this period recognized the transformation wrought by the Court. In Baker v. Carr, the 1962 decision
that began the reapportionment revolution, Justice Frankfurter decried the Court’s “massive repudiation of the experience of our whole
119
past.” At great length, he reviewed the history of American districting, which previously had revolved around the territorial community,
120
and argued that it was this history that the Court was abandoning.
In Reynolds, similarly, Justice Harlan condemned the rupture with the
past represented by the one-person, one-vote decisions. He noted that
the Court had dismissed in turn every non-population factor once
thought relevant to districting: “(1) history; (2) economic or other

congressional plan that followed “tradition of respecting the integrity of the boundaries
of cities and counties”).
114
377 U.S. 713 (1964).
115
Id. at 717.
116
Id. at 726-28, 738.
117
Id. at 738-39.
118
Id. at 719-20.
119
369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
120
See, e.g., id. at 269 (“[G]eography, economics, [and] urban-rural conflict . . . have
throughout our history entered into political districting . . . .”); id. at 301 (noting that
one-person, one-vote “was not the English system, it was not the colonial system, it was
not the system chosen for the national government by the Constitution”).
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sorts of group interests; (3) area; [and] (4) geographical considera121
tions . . . .” In Lucas too, Justice Stewart contended that the Court’s
“draconian” adherence to equipopulation conflicted with the “strongly
felt American tradition” that “many diverse interests” should be “ex122
pressed by a medley of component voices” in the legislature.
As all of the Justices expected (some eagerly, others apprehensively), the reapportionment revolution swiftly stripped the territorial
community of its centrality in American districting. Once federal,
state, and local districts were all required to possess the same population, the number of communities that had to be divided or merged
increased radically. In almost all areas, communities were not equipopulous, meaning that the only way to comply with the one-person,
one-vote rule was to countenance their wholesale disruption. As Micah
Altman found in a detailed study, “[T]he frequency of violations of
‘traditional boundaries’ skyrocket[ed] following the population re123
quirements imposed by the Court in Reynolds . . . .” Counties, cities,
and wards were broken up at triple their earlier rate, and the splitting
124
of rural communities became widespread as well.
The reapportionment revolution also undermined the territorial
community in a second, subtler way. Under the Court’s one-person,
one-vote doctrine, districts must be redrawn each decade after the lat125
est Census figures are released. As a result, there is now less opportunity for communities to coalesce on the basis of district boundaries.

121

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 622-23 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 384
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that “[t]he Court’s holding surely flies in
the face of history”); Baker, 369 U.S. at 330 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing “abrupt
departure the majority makes from judicial history”).
122
Lucas, 377 U.S. at 746, 751 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
123
Altman, supra note 92, at 187.
124
Id. at 180; see also Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform Since Baker v. Carr (“The equal population criterion inevitably wreaked havoc
on geographic representation since in many instances homogeneous communities of
interest had to be split or combined in order to achieve population equality . . . .”), in
PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 6, 8
(Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting
Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 112
(2000) (“[L]egislators used to be extremely reluctant to violate city, county, and township lines. Now, under ‘one person, one vote,’ they are required to do so.”).
125
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84.
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Every ten years, those borders are unpredictably shaken and stirred,
destabilizing any nascent communities that have begun to develop
around them. As one scholar has explained, “A boundary that is continually moving is one that is unlikely to serve . . . as a dividing line between genuinely distinct political communities. In this way, one person,
one vote continually impedes the formation . . . of meaningful local pol126
itical identity.”
C. Comeback
According to the conventional narrative, this is where the tale of
the territorial community ends. Once at the heart of the American system of representation, it now has been eclipsed for good by the one127
In this Section, I argue that this narrative is
person, one-vote rule.
simplistic and in many ways incorrect. While the territorial community
may play a relatively small role in contemporary redistricting practice, it
remains very much alive in both federal and state doctrine. In fact, in
areas as diverse as (1) reapportionment, (2) racial vote dilution, (3)
racial gerrymandering, (4) political gerrymandering, and (5) state redistricting law, the courts’ intuition that districts and communities
should coincide still commonly drives (and gives coherence to) judicial
outcomes. This Section discusses the relevant case law and presents the
surprisingly strong case for the territorial community’s continued doctrinal relevance. The Section errs on the side of thoroughness because
this story is an important one that has not previously been told.
1. Reapportionment
As noted above, by the end of the 1960s, the Supreme Court refused to permit district population variances even if they were quite
small and resulted from a good faith effort to respect the integrity of

126

Gardner, Possibility of Community, supra note 27, at 1242.
Cf., e.g., id. at 1238-43 (failing to consider post-1960s doctrinal history of territorial community); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 173-74 (1989)
(same); McConnell, supra note 124, at 108, 112 (same); Richard H. Pildes, Formalism
and Functionalism in the Constitutional Law of Politics, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1525 (2003)
(same).
127
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128

territorial communities.
Just a couple years later, the Court commenced a fairly dramatic retreat from this absolutist position. Over a
series of decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court accepted moderate—and, in one case, extreme—population deviations that were the
product of state policies promoting the representation of political subdivisions. In the very field in which district-community congruence
decisively had been rejected, it made a swift and improbable comeback.
The comeback began with the 1971 case of Abate v. Mundt, in
which the Court upheld districts for a county legislature that coincided
129
Though these districts were
perfectly with the county’s five towns.
just as divergent in population as those struck down in earlier decisions, the Court was suddenly flexible where before it had been unyielding. “[T]he particular circumstances and needs of a local
community . . . may sometimes justify departures from strict equality,”
the Court remarked, adding that “exact [town-district] correspondence” was desirable because it “encourage[d] town supervisors to serve
130
These were the same arguments about dison the county board.”
tinct local interests and the quality of representation that the Court
131
previously had dismissed out of hand.
In a 1973 case, the Court likewise endorsed a Virginia district plan
132
Though
that carefully avoided crossing city or county boundaries.
the plan’s population deviations again were substantial, the Court deferred to the state’s policy of “avoid[ing] the fragmentation of such
133
The
subdivisions” and “afford[ing] them a voice in Richmond.”
Court further argued, in a mode entirely absent from its 1960s decisions, that adverse consequences would follow if counties were divided
among multiple districts: “The opportunity of [their] voters to cham-

128

See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
403 U.S. 182, 184-87 (1971). These districts had a maximum deviation of 11.9%.
Id. at 184.
130
Id. at 185, 187.
131
See NANCY MAVEETY, REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND THE BURGER YEARS 46 (1991)
(describing Abate as “the first Burger decision that is clearly consistent with the conceptualization of territorial representation”); Alfange, supra note 22, at 198 (noting that
with Abate “the Court began a retreat from the extreme rigidity of its 1969 position”).
132
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-28 (1973). The plan had a maximum deviation of 16.4%. Id. at 319.
133
Id. at 323.
129
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pion local legislation [would be] virtually nil,” and their “representation [would be] no representation at all so far as local legislation is
134
concerned.”
More remarkable still was the Court’s 1983 ratification of a Wyoming district, corresponding to a small county, whose population di135
verged by sixty percent from the ideal. The Court approvingly cited the
state legislature’s position that “the needs of each county are unique
136
The
and the interests of each county must be guaranteed a voice.”
Court also relied on the trial court’s findings that “[t]he people within
each county have many interests in common” and that “to deny these
people their own representative borders on abridging their right to be
137
represented.” Reasoning of this sort, of course, would have been unthinkable during the Warren Court’s one-person, one-vote heyday. In
that era, nothing was allowed to interfere with the Court’s quest for
perfect population equality; indeed, claims that communities were
unique and required their own representation routinely were reject138
ed. Fifteen years later, however, the Court was willing to tolerate extreme population inequality as long as it was the result of a “legitimate
139
policy of preserving county boundaries.” District-community congruence had returned with a vengeance.

134

Id. at 324; see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161-62 (1993) (overturning
district court’s decision to hold Ohio district plan unconstitutional that had substantial
population deviations caused by “policy in favor of preserving county boundaries”);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 & n.8 (1973) (largely upholding Texas plan with
sizeable population variations that were precipitated by “policy against cutting county
lines in forming representative districts”).
135
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 843, 848 (1983).
136
Id. at 839 n.4 (quoting 1981 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 76, § 3).
137
Id. at 841 n.5 (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 536 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Wyo.
1982), aff’d, 462 U.S. 835); see also id. (noting district court’s finding that small county’s
interests would be “virtually unprotected” if it were merged with larger county);
Shapiro, supra note 43, at 234 (“[Brown] recognized what Chief Justice Warren had
steadfastly refused to recognize—that political geography exists.”).
138
See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
139
Brown, 462 U.S. at 847. Brown is unusual in that the plaintiffs challenged only
the over-representation of a single small county, and not the validity of the district plan
as a whole. See id. at 846-47. Had they advanced a broader challenge, they may well
have prevailed. See id. at 848-50 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Moreover, the Court has
shown no willingness to relax the one-person, one-vote rule for congressional (as opposed to state or local) districting. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727, 744
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2. Racial Vote Dilution
District-community congruence has only ever played a starring role
in the realm of racial vote dilution. In this field, under both the Con140
stitution and the Voting Rights Act (VRA), minority plaintiffs may
bring claims that their votes have been unlawfully diluted. They may
argue, in other words, that they have been denied sufficient political
influence by district lines that “pack” or “crack” minority groups or by
multimember districts in which minority voices are drowned out. Crucially, whether a dilution claim is constitutional or statutory, it requires
in effect that the minority group constitute a coherent territorial
community. Under the Equal Protection Clause, both dilution cases
in which the Supreme Court has granted relief have involved distinct
minority communities. Similarly, under section 2 of the VRA, the
Court’s operative test includes explicit prongs for geographic compactness and political cohesiveness.
The Court first ruled in favor of plaintiffs advancing a constitutional claim of racial vote dilution in the 1973 case of White v.
141
Mexican Americans in San Antonio argued that they were
Regester.
effectively excluded from representation in the state legislature by a
countywide multimember district. The Court agreed, and replaced
the multimember district with multiple single-member districts, in
large part because it viewed the city’s Mexican Americans as a discrete
142
The Court observed
and underprivileged geographic community.
that almost all of the Mexican Americans lived close together in the
Barrio, “an area of poor housing” whose “residents have low income
and a high rate of unemployment” and “suffer[] a cultural and lan143
It was precisely in order “to bring the community
guage barrier.”
into the full stream of political life” that the Court authorized the crea-

(1983) (striking down congressional district plan with maximum population deviation
of less than one percent).
140
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (2006)).
141
412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973).
142
Id. at 769.
143
Id. at 768.
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tion of single-member districts in which the Mexican Americans could
144
elect their preferred candidates.
The logic of the Court’s other decision granting relief to plaintiffs
for constitutional vote dilution was nearly identical. In a 1982 case,
the Court found that African Americans in rural Burke County, Georgia, were a “cohesive political group” with a “depressed socioeconomic
145
status,” “less formal education,” and “less pay.”
Accordingly, the
Court dismantled the at-large election system that had prevented a
single African American from being elected to the county commission,
146
again replacing it with multiple single-member districts.
The Court has not decided a constitutional vote dilution case since
1982 because, in that same year, Congress amended section 2 of the
147
VRA to make it easier to bring statutory dilution claims.
In its 1986
decision interpreting the revised statute, Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court
set forth a test composed of three prongs, two of which focus directly
148
on whether a minority group comprises a territorial community.
“First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district,” and “[s]econd, the minority group must be able
149
A minority group that cannot
to show that it is politically cohesive.”
establish that it is geographically compact and politically cohesive—in
other words, that it is a territorial community—cannot make out a dilution claim.
Pursuant to this test, the Court has repeatedly ruled against minority
groups that failed to prove compactness or cohesiveness. In a 1993 case,
for example, the Court concluded that a motley set of minority plaintiffs

144

Id. at 769. For similar reasons, the White Court also invalidated a Dallas multimember district that disadvantaged an African American community. See id. at 765-67.
145
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626-27 (1982).
146
See id. at 627-28.
147
See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2, 96
Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
148
478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
149
Id. (emphasis added). The Court further explained that “members of geographically insular racial and ethnic groups” are entitled to statutory protection because they “frequently share socioeconomic characteristics” that can give rise to
communal ties, such as “income level, employment status, amount of education, housing and other living conditions, religion, [and] language.” Id. at 64.
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from Minneapolis (including African Americans, Hispanics, Asian
150
An
Americans, and Native Americans) was not politically cohesive.
“agglomeration of distinct minority groups,” lacking shared interests or
a common identity, could not amount to a community or prevail in a
151
Similarly, in a pair of 1996 cases, the Court
vote dilution challenge.
held that highly non-compact districts combining disparate minority
152
groups could not remedy alleged section 2 violations. Districts like the
one in Texas that “reache[d] out to grab small and apparently isolated
153
minority communities” could never be required by the VRA.
Conversely, in the important 2006 case League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC )v. Perry, the Court both found vote dilution when
a coherent Hispanic community in Texas was fragmented, and rejected a proposed remedy that involved merging dissimilar Hispanic
154
communities. The vote dilution took place when a “cohesive Latino
community” that previously had been placed in a single district, and
that had developed an “efficacious political identity,” was dispersed
among multiple districts in order to protect an imperiled incumbent
155
politician. “The State not only made fruitless the Latinos’ mobilization efforts [against the incumbent] but also acted against those Latinos
who were becoming most politically active, dividing them with a dis156
This sort of deliberate
trict line through the middle of Laredo.”
community disruption, the Court held (with Justice Kennedy writing),
157
was prohibited.
Analogously, the problem with the State’s proposed remedial district was that, while it had a Hispanic majority, it fused together two

150

Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 38-41 (1993).
Id. at 41.
152
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979 (1996) (plurality opinion); Shaw II, 517 U.S.
899, 916-17 (1996).
153
Bush, 517 U.S. at 979; see also Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 916 (holding that district that
did not contain geographically compact minority population “could not remedy any
potential § 2 violation”). The Court also stated explicitly in Bush that the section 2 compactness inquiry should take into account communal considerations. See 517 U.S. at 977.
154
548 U.S. 399, 430-31, 435 (2006).
155
Id. at 435, 439.
156
Id. at 440; see also id. at 441 (“The State chose to break apart a Latino opportunity
district to protect the incumbent congressman from the growing dissatisfaction of the
cohesive and politically active Latino community in the district.”).
157
Id. at 440-41.
151
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very different Hispanic communities. “[T]here was a 300-mile gap between the Latino communities [in the district], and a similarly large
158
Hispanics
gap between the needs and interests of the two groups.”
along the Mexican border and in Austin were “distant, disparate
communities,” with major “differences in socio-economic status, edu159
A district
cation, employment, health, and other characteristics.”
that combined these “two farflung segments of a racial group with disparate interests” thus could not cure the section 2 violation identified
160
A better example of how the territorial community
by the Court.
test would operate (at least with regard to racial minorities) is hard to
imagine. District-community congruence had become, in LULAC, the
Court’s measure for both vote dilution and any effort to remedy the
161
wrongdoing.
3. Racial Gerrymandering
Though the literature has not yet recognized it, the Court also has
employed something akin to the territorial community test in the context of racial gerrymandering. In this field of equal protection doctrine, which originated with the 1993 decision of Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I),
a plaintiff may challenge a district on the ground that race was the
162
predominant motive for the district’s creation.
In a series of decisions since Shaw I, the Court uniformly has struck down districts that
combined disparate communities or deviated substantially from the
larger communities in which they were located. On the other hand,
the Court invariably has upheld districts that coincided with underlying
geographic communities. District-community congruence therefore

158

Id. at 432.
Id. at 432, 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
160
Id. at 433.
161
Cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
48, 50 (2006), http://michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105/ortiz.pdf; Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1159
(2007) (noting that in LULAC “[t]he touchstone appears to be the concept of a ‘naturally arising’ minority district, one that exists or would exist due to the geographic concentration of minority voters whose proximity also reflects common socioeconomic and
other interests”).
162
509 U.S. 630, 642, 649 (1993).
159
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seems to be an ironclad defense to the charge that a district is a racial
gerrymander.
In both Shaw I and its 1996 sequel, the Court objected to a majorityblack North Carolina district that joined together “tobacco country,
163
financial centers, and manufacturing areas.” The Court commented
that districts that combine minority populations from different geographic communities are constitutionally suspect. “A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the
same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical
and political boundaries . . . bears an uncomfortable resemblance to
164
political apartheid.” In a 1995 case, the Court likewise invalidated a
Georgia district that lumped together blacks in Atlanta and coastal
165
These communities were “260 miles apart in disChatham County.
tance and worlds apart in culture,” and they were characterized by
166
Their fusion
“fractured political, social, and economic interests.”
plainly was not motivated by concern for community integrity, and indeed could be explained only by prohibited racial considerations.
The communal harm was somewhat different in the 1996 case of
167
Bush v. Vera. The three Texas districts at issue did not merge different
communities, but they did markedly concentrate what were relatively
diffuse minority populations. One Dallas district meandered around
168
the city in order “to connect dispersed minority population[s],” using “far-reaching tentacles that intricately and consistently maxim169
Analogously,
ize[d] the available . . . African-American population.”
the “interlocking shapes” of two Houston districts were “almost exclusively[] the result of an effort to create, out of largely integrated com-

163

Id. at 635; see also Shaw II , 517 U.S. 899, 903, 917-18 (1996).
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647; see also id. (objecting to districts “in which a State concentrated a dispersed minority”).
165
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917-20, 922 (1995).
166
Id. at 908, 919; see also id. at 908 (“[T]he social, political, and economic makeup
of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community.”).
167
517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion).
168
Id. at 966.
169
Id. at 971 n.*.
164
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munities, both a majority-black and a majority-Hispanic district.”
The Court found all three districts unconstitutional, in large part because they did not reflect accurately the characteristics of the broader
communities in which they were drawn. Again, the disjunction between constituency and community signaled that race had played too
large a role in the districts’ creation.
Conversely, the Court’s more recent racial gerrymandering decisions all have upheld districts that did correspond to underlying territorial communities. In one 1997 case, the Court approved a Georgia
district plan that avoided splitting counties, noting that “[t]hese small
counties represent communities of interest” that should not be need171
In another 1997 case, the Court enlessly “chopp[ed] . . . in half.”
dorsed a Tampa Bay district whose residents “regard[ed] themselves as a
community” and that “comprise[d] a predominantly urban, low-income
population . . . whose white and black members alike share[d] a simi172
larly depressed economic condition and interests that reflect[ed] it.”
And in the 1999 and 2001 chapters of North Carolina’s Shaw saga, the
Court twice upheld a revised version of the district it previously had
173
invalidated. One reason for the Court’s change of heart was that the
updated district “joined three major cities in a manner . . . reflecting a
real commonality of urban interests, [such as] inner city schools, ur174
ban health care[, and] public housing problems.” The updated district, in other words, possessed the coherent communal identity that
its predecessor had lacked.
4. Political Gerrymandering
In the political gerrymandering arena, unlike in the above areas, a
majority of the Court has never embraced the proposition that elec-

170

Id. at 1033 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 975 (plurality opinion) (describing “intricacy of the lines drawn, separating Hispanic voters from African-American
voters on a block-by-block basis”).
171
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 100 (1997).
172
Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
173
See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
541, 552-54 (1999).
174
Easley, 532 U.S. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hunt, 526 U.S.
at 544 (describing revised district).
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toral districts should correspond to territorial communities. At the
same time, the Court has never rejected the proposition either. The
Court has rebuffed all sorts of other potential standards for political
gerrymandering cases: for example, that voters should not experience
a consistent degradation of their political influence, that the predominant motive for a district’s creation should not be partisan advantage,
and that statewide minority parties should not be able to entrench
175
themselves in office. But the territorial community test proposed by
this Article has never been definitively assessed.
However, the notion that districts and communities should coincide
has animated several Justices’ separate opinions in political gerrymandering cases. A template for analyzing district-community congruence—which could be adopted in the future without raising any stare
decisis concerns—thus exists already in the case law. In the 1983 case
of Karcher v. Daggett, for instance, Justice Stevens’s concurrence argued
that New Jersey’s district plan was unconstitutional because, among
176
other things, it brazenly disrupted communities across the state.
The plan “wantonly disregard[ed] county boundaries” and evinced
177
“little effort to create districts having a community of interests.” The
residents of several districts were served by “different television and
radio stations, different newspapers, and different transportation sys178
tems.” Two districts were particularly offensive because they merged,
respectively, “New York suburbs [and] the rural upper reaches of the
Delaware River” and “industrial Elizabeth, liberal, academic Princeton
179
and largely Jewish Marlboro.”
Similarly, in the 1986 case of Davis v. Bandemer, Justice Powell’s separate opinion endorsed district-community congruence at the levels of
180
both theory and practice.
From a theoretical standpoint, “[a]dherence to community boundaries . . . both deter[s] the possibilities of
gerrymandering, and allow[s] communities to have a voice in the legisla-

175

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
462 U.S. 725, 762 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). The majority opinion in
Karcher solely addressed one-person, one-vote issues.
177
Id. at 762, 764 n.33.
178
Id. at 764 n.33.
179
Id. at 762-63; see also id. at 789 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that many districts
did not “reflect any attempt to follow natural, historical, or local political boundaries”).
180
478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176
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181

ture that directly controls their local interests.”
But districts that do
not correspond to communities, in Justice Powell’s view, foster voter
uncertainty and apathy. “Confusion inevitably follows . . . when a citizen
finds himself or herself forced to associate with several artificial communities,” and “the potential for voter disillusion and nonparticipation is great, as voters are forced to focus their political activities in
182
artificial electoral units.”
Applying these principles, Justice Powell found much to criticize in
Indiana’s district plan (which he would have invalidated). As a whole,
the plan showed “no concern for any adherence to principles of community interest,” as it “carved up counties, cities, and even townships”
183
into “strange shapes lacking in common interests.”
One especially
objectionable district combined “blacks in Washington Township and
white suburbanites in Hamilton and Boone Counties,” while another
merged “Allen and Noble County farmers with residents of downtown
184
Fort Wayne itself was cut in two, and each half was
Fort Wayne.”
185
linked to faraway rural counties.
Around Indianapolis as well, an
irregular C-shaped district “include[d] portions of the urban southwestside of the city, the airport and suburban area . . . on the west side,
186
and the Meridian Hills area at the northern part of the county.”
With its strong theoretical mooring and detailed factual analysis, this
opinion is the best example in the Court’s case law of how the territorial community test would function (particularly with regard to nonracial communities).
In the Court’s two most recent political gerrymandering decisions,
Vieth in 2004 and LULAC in 2006, the dissenters once again called attention to districts that failed to respect community boundaries. In
Vieth, Justice Stevens argued that a Pennsylvania district that “loom[ed]
like a dragon descending on Philadelphia from the west, splitting up
towns and communities throughout Montgomery and Berks Counties”

181

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 173 n.13, 177 (internal quotation marks omitted).
183
Id. at 176; see also id. at 177 (“[T]he mapmakers gave no consideration to the interests of communities.”); id. (“[T]he manner in which the districts divide established
communities . . . illustrate that community interests were ignored . . . .”).
184
Id.
185
Id. at 180.
186
Id. at 180 n.21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
182
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187

should be struck down. In LULAC, likewise, he would have held unconstitutional four Texas districts that were formed when a “minority
community . . . was splintered and submerged into majority Anglo dis188
tricts in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.” The issue of district-community
congruence was not as fully developed in these opinions as in Karcher
189
and Bandemer (in part because of the parties’ litigation strategies ),
but the communal strand still remained salient. Were the Court so
inclined, it could easily weave this strand into its future gerrymandering decisions.
5. State Redistricting Law
It is not just in federal doctrine that the territorial community has
made a comeback in the last few decades. In state law too, it is now
recognized in a number of constitutions and statutes, and in even
more non-binding redistricting guidelines. State courts also tend to
conceive of gerrymandering as the disruption of organic geographic
communities and the creation of artificial political cleavages—
precisely the definition implicit in the territorial community test. In
recent years, indeed, a number of state courts have used the test to
strike down districts that did not adhere to community boundaries and
to uphold districts that did.
The constitutions of five states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, and Hawaii) expressly require districts to reflect community interests. These provisions all were adopted between 1959 and 2010,
and they include such formulations as Alaska’s mandate that districts
190
contain “a relatively integrated socio-economic area,” California’s
declaration that “[t]he geographic integrity of any . . . local community
of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes [its] divi-

187

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 340 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
188
LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 479 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). It is clear that Justice Stevens would have invalidated these districts on political gerrymandering grounds, not because of racial vote dilution. See id. at 475.
189
The petitioners in Vieth focused on statewide rather than district-specific claims.
See 541 U.S. at 355 (Souter, J., dissenting). The petitioners in LULAC emphasized the
mid-decade timing of Texas’s redistricting. See 548 U.S. at 413-23 (opinion of Kennedy,
J.).
190
ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6.
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191

sion,” and Hawaii’s admonition that communities not be “submerge[d]” within areas where “substantially different socio-economic
192
Seven additional states have statutory reinterests predominate.”
quirements that districts correspond to communities where possible,
and a further twelve states adopted non-binding guidelines including
193
These statutes
similar provisions during the last redistricting cycle.
and guidelines typically use the term “community of interest,” and
when the term is defined, it usually refers to the shared social, cultural,
194
and economic interests of people living in a particular area.
Consistent with these provisions, state courts tend to embrace the
theory of communal representation (discussed above in Section I.A)
and to understand gerrymandering as the violation of territorial communities. James Gardner recently completed a thorough survey of the
state constitutional law on redistricting, in which he reached the follow195
ing three conclusions about the views of the state courts:
First, they
generally consider the entity that is represented in the legislature to be
not the individual person (or any arbitrary set of people), but rather a
geographic area that corresponds to particular interests. “[T]erritory
and interest . . . typically are thought to coincide. People who live in the
same place . . . are thought to have similar interests . . . [that] justify rep196
Second,
resenting them in the legislature by territorial groupings.”
the reasons why state courts believe that geographic proximity generates

191

CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(8); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(D) (“District boundaries shall respect communities of interest to the extent practicable . . . .”);
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(3) (“[C]ommunities of interest, including ethnic, cultural,
economic, trade area, geographic, and demographic factors, shall be preserved . . . .”).
In addition, the county-preservation provision in North Carolina’s constitution and the
compactness provision in Rhode Island’s constitution have been judicially interpreted
to require consideration of communities of interest. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562
S.E.2d 377, 397 (N.C. 2002); Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1255 (R.I. 2006).
193
The seven states with statutory requirements are Idaho, Maine, Oregon, South
Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. The twelve states with similar guidelines are Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming. See NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 172-217 (2009) [hereinafter NCSL
GUIDE] (describing redistricting process in each state).
194
See id.
195
See Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27.
196
Id. at 933-34.
192
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a sense of community are (1) that people who live nearby “share a
common local economy and economic life” and (2) that they “participate together in the public life of a shared unit of political and govern197
Community flows, in other words, from
mental administration.”
shared commercial and civic experience.
Third, and most important here, state courts usually define gerrymandering as the needless disruption of geographic communities.
Districts are supposed to correspond to such communities in order to
produce a political life that is “harmonious at home due to the unity of
local economic interest” and “conflictual far away in the state legisla198
Gerryture due to the . . . diversity of the interests represented.”
mandering, alas, interferes on both sides of the equation. At the district
level, it divides communities and combines people with conflicting in199
At the state legislative level, it enterests, thus fostering acrimony.
courages partisanship and ideological extremism instead of hearty
pluralism. “[P]recisely because it disregards the ‘natural’ territorial
cleavages . . . that divide the state populace,” gerrymandering enables
200
Or so, at least, say the state
the ascendance of party and ideology.
courts.
Based on this conception of gerrymandering, courts in ten states
201
202
203
204
205
206
(Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, North

197

Id. at 939.
Id. at 963-64.
199
Id. at 964.
200
Id. at 965.
201
In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141, 149-50 (Alaska 2002); Hickel v. Se.
Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 44-54 (Alaska 1993); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743
P.2d 1352, 1359-61 (Alaska 1987); Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1214-15
(Alaska 1983); Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 879-80 (Alaska 1974).
202
Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
121 P.3d 843, 867-70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
203
In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 46 P.3d 1083, 1090-91 (Colo.
2002); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1247-49, 1251-52
(Colo. 2002); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 213, 215-17
(Colo. 1992); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 194-200
(Colo. 1992); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 212-13
(Colo. 1982); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 194 (Colo.
1982).
204
Bingham Cnty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863, 865-71
(Idaho 2002).
198
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210

Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont ) have invalidated districts that did not correspond to geographic communities and
upheld districts that did. These decisions—which vividly illustrate the
territorial community test in action—all were handed down between
1974 and 2006, with their frequency increasing in recent years. In
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, the decisions were based on state constitutional requirements that districts
and communities coincide, while the Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Oregon, and Vermont cases relied on analogous statutory and guideline
provisions. In sum, courts have assessed more than fifty districts based
on their adherence to community boundaries, of which a solid majority
211
have been upheld.
Examples of districts that have been struck down include: an Alaska district that joined the hub of an agricultural region with coastal
212
fishing villages; another Alaska district that merged suburban Wasilla
213
with urban Anchorage; a Colorado district that combined very dif-

205

Graham v. Thornburgh, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1294-95 (D. Kan. 2002); In re Petition of Stephan, 836 P.2d 574, 581-83 (Kan. 1992).
206
McBride v. Mahoney, 573 F. Supp. 913, 915-18 (D. Mont. 1983).
207
Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247, 252-54 (N.C. 2003).
208
Hartung v. Bradbury, 33 P.3d 972 (Or. 2001); Ater v. Keisling, 819 P.2d 296,
304-06 (Or. 1991).
209
Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1255-56 (R.I. 2006).
210
In re Reapportionment of Towns of Woodbury & Worcester, 861 A.2d 1117 (Vt.
2004); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
323, 345-46 (Vt. 1993).
211
Both state and federal courts have also drawn districts based in large part on
communal considerations. See, e.g., Baumgart v. Wendelberger, Nos. 01-0121, 02-0366,
2002 WL 34127471, at *3, *7 (E.D. Wis. May 30, 2002); Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d
529, 542-46 (S.D. Miss. 2002); Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F.
Supp. 684, 688 (D. Ariz. 1992); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D.
Wis. 1992); Wis. State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 636-38 (E.D. Wis.
1982); Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 89-93 (D. Colo. 1982); LaComb v. Growe,
541 F. Supp. 145, 148-50 (D. Minn. 1982); O’Sullivan v. Brier, 540 F. Supp. 1200, 120306 (D. Kan. 1982); Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856, 894, 896 (Alaska 1972); Wilson v.
Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 551-53 (Cal. 1992); Legislature of Cal. v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 10, 16
(Cal. 1973); Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642, 647, 651-52 (Colo. 2002); In re 2003 Apportionment of State Senate, 827 A.2d 844, 847-48 (Me. 2003); Mellow v. Mitchell, 607
A.2d 204, 224 (Pa. 1992).
212
See Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 52-53 (Alaska 1993).
213
See id. at 53.
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214

ferent neighborhoods within Denver; two more Colorado districts
215
that divided Aspen from neighboring Snowmass; three Idaho dis216
tricts that split the state’s rugged southeast corner; and a Vermont
district that lumped together towns on opposite sides of the Green
217
Conversely, districts have been upheld where there was
Mountains.
evidence that their residents worked in similar industries, shared a
racial or ethnic heritage, interacted in community organizations, received information from the same media sources, or were connected
218
by transport links. In these circumstances, the courts could not conclude that any community disruption—with its negative implications
for harmony in the district and partisanship in the legislature—had
occurred.
III. DEVELOPING THE DOCTRINE
The above Parts demonstrate that the principle of districtcommunity congruence has a robust theoretical, historical, and doctrinal pedigree. It is rooted in a theory of representation that is particularly consistent with the American commitment to geographic
districting. It has functioned as a crucial touchstone for district drawers for most of American history. And, though neither courts nor
scholars previously have noticed, it continues to drive judicial outcomes in a host of election law domains.
Accordingly, there is at least a plausible basis for the Supreme
Court to constitutionalize the territorial community test. In Philip
Bobbitt’s terminology, the test is supported by ethical, historical, and
219
doctrinal modalities of constitutional argument.
To be sure, an ex-

214

See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 212 (Colo.

1982).
215

See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 195-96 (Colo.

1992).
216

See Bingham Cnty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863, 869-71
(Idaho 2002). Because the court struck down the entire district plan on one-person,
one-vote grounds, its discussion of certain communities’ division was technically dicta.
217
See In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624
A.2d 323, 331 (Vt. 1993).
218
See infra notes 237-48.
219
See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) (summarizing
six modalities of constitutional interpretation). The territorial community test is also
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plicit textual hook is missing, but similar concerns did not prevent the
Court from endorsing the one-person, one-vote rule (the only Equal
Protection doctrine that ignores intent altogether) or the prohibition
on racial gerrymandering (the only standard that does not require any
particularized harm). Moreover, as Issacharoff and Pildes have noted,
the Constitution addresses electoral practices in such oblique terms
that the Court has long had to fashion the law of democracy mostly by
220
reference to overarching structural principles. Justices and academics alike have therefore sought to combat political gerrymandering
without worrying much about the specific textual bases for their ef221
forts. The territorial community test fits squarely within this tradition.
This Part, then, considers how the test might operate if it were
converted by the Court—or enacted by Congress, the states, or the
222
people themselves—into actual doctrine. I first define the territorial

supported by Bobbitt’s structural and prudential modalities of argument. Cf. infra Parts
IV-V (discussing test’s manageability and political consequences); infra text accompanying
note 220 (elaborating on structural value of participatory democracy).
220
See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 10, at 713, 716 (discussing “the great silences
of the Constitution regarding the structure of electoral politics” and the “Court’s efforts to fill the gaps of [its] framework for democratic politics”); see also Issacharoff,
supra note 70, at 687-88. The structural principle that is most relevant here is participatory democracy, which is rooted most deeply in the Republican Guarantee Clause, see
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, and which has been stressed by writers including John Hart Ely,
see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 116-25
(1980), and Justice Breyer, see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 21-34 (2005). As both a theoretical and an empirical matter, districts that correspond to territorial communities tend to promote democratic
participation. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing theoretical reasons
why this is so); see also infra subsections V.A.3, V.B.3 (presenting empirical confirmation).
221
None of the Justices who proposed political gerrymandering standards in Karcher, Bandemer, Vieth, and LULAC attempted to provide any textual foundation for their
approaches. Similarly, Issacharoff and Pildes freely admit that their competitioncentered test is not textually grounded. See Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 687 (conceding that he can offer “no narrow textual justification” for his approach); Issacharoff &
Pildes, supra note 10, at 716.
222
Because the territorial community test is not constitutionally compelled, it might
be preferable for it to be adopted by legislation or popular initiative rather than by
judicial declaration. In addition, even if the test is not embraced as a self-standing bar
on gerrymandering, it could be treated as a key component of a broader inquiry. For
instance, a district plan’s needless disruption of geographic communities is powerful
evidence that partisan advantage (or incumbent protection) motivated the line-drawers.
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community as clearly as possible, drawing on state and federal case law
as well as state constitutional provisions. I next explain how judges
might employ the territorial community test to assess district plans,
again using doctrinal examples and focusing on the three ways in
which communities can be disrupted: fusion, fragmentation, and subversion. Lastly, I discuss the test’s links to adjacent election law domains, arguing that it would promote doctrinal coherence, reduce violations of other redistricting rules, and lessen the salience of divisive
racial rhetoric.
A. Defining the Territorial Community
As used in this Article, a territorial community is (1) a geographically defined group of people who (2) share similar social, cultural,
and economic interests and (3) believe they are part of the same coherent entity. The first element, geographic demarcation, is necessary
because of the American commitment to geographic districting.
While non-geographic communities certainly exist, they cannot easily
be captured by districts that are drawn spatially. The second element,
shared interests, is mostly objective in character and gives rise to
groups of people who are affected in similar ways by (and usually have
similar positions on) the gamut of governmental actions. The common concerns that are most relevant here are those that bear on some
matter of actual or potential governmental policy. Lastly, the third
element, a feeling of communal affiliation, is subjective in nature. It
ensures that members of a community actually understand themselves
223
to be part of the same cognizable unit.

Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 339 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating
partisan intent as standard for identifying unconstitutional gerrymanders).
223
Unsurprisingly, this definition is closely related to the theory of communal representation discussed in Section I.A. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. It is
also similar to the definitions advanced by various scholars. See, e.g., Richard Briffault,
The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1127
(1996) (referring to community as “a place with a distinctive history, identifiable characteristics, and a unique identity”); Ford, supra note 58, at 859 (“An organic community
may be united primarily by economy or by culture.”); David M. Hummon, Community
Attachment: Local Sentiment and Sense of Place (discussing community’s “complex sources
in both subjectively perceived and objective aspects of the local environment”), in
PLACE ATTACHMENT 253, 253 (Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low eds., 1992).
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This definition draws from earlier judicial and state constitutional
efforts. The Supreme Court’s Gingles factors, for example, require that
a minority group be geographically compact, politically cohesive, and,
at least as construed in LULAC, socioeconomically and culturally uni224
My conception of the territorial community is not very differfied.
ent from the application of the Gingles factors to all groups rather than
only to racial minorities. Similarly, state and lower federal courts often
have drawn districts so that they correspond to “[t]he social and economic interests common to the population of an area which are prob225
able subjects of legislative action” or to “distinctive units which share
common concerns with respect to . . . demography, ethnicity, culture,
226
While these standards do not take
socio-economic status or trade.”
into account people’s subjective sense of affiliation, they are otherwise
analogous to my approach. So too are state constitutional provisions
that define the territorial community in objective terms: e.g., “a rela227
tively integrated socio-economic area” (Alaska), or “a contiguous
population which shares common social and economic interests” (Cal228
ifornia).
I use the term “territorial community” instead of the more common “community of interest” because of certain connotations that the
latter phrase has acquired. For one thing, a community of interest
does not have to be spatially bounded, meaning that it coexists uneasi-

It is worth noting as well that territorial communities can shift over time as people’s
interests and affiliations change. Courts should keep in mind the possibility of such
shifts when they seek to ascertain community boundaries. Lastly, it is important to
acknowledge that there are inevitably exceptions and outliers in any territorial community. The concept is meant to capture the interests and affiliations of most—not all—
people in a geographically defined area. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
224
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986); see also supra notes 147-61
and accompanying text.
225
Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 16 (Cal. 1973); see also Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan Submissions at 3, Zachman v. Kiffmeyer,
No. C0-01-160 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Dec. 11, 2001) (defining communities of interest as “groups of Minnesota citizens with clearly recognizable similarities of
social, geographic, political, cultural, ethnic, economic, or other interests”).
226
Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 91 (D. Colo. 1982).
227
ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6.
228
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Vermont,
and Virginia include similar definitions in their state constitutions, statutes, or redistricting guidelines. See NCSL GUIDE, supra note 193, at 175-76, 183-84, 194-96, 210-14.
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ly with the American system of geographic districting. In addition, a
community of interest can be deemed to arise on the basis of any
common concern, making the term notably imprecise and mallea229
With its strong geographic valence and emphasis on the full
ble.
array of interests and affiliations that people share, the concept of a
territorial community seems substantially more determinate.
A territorial community also is not quite the same thing as a political subdivision such as a town or county. The two may sometimes be
functionally identical, both because subdivisions tend to be inhabited
230
by people with similar socioeconomic characteristics, and because
civic ties can foster a sense of kinship. But communities and subdivisions are often different as well—as when people’s interests and affiliations do not follow subdivision lines, or when subdivisions contain
231
within them more than one (or only part of a) community. There is
thus nothing wrong with judges beginning their inquiry with subdivision
boundaries, but the task of identifying territorial communities cannot
232
end there.
Furthermore, territorial communities exist, and should be represented in the legislature, at different levels of generality. As the geographer David Knight has written, “[W]e have ties to different scales of
territory and . . . we can operate at several levels of abstraction at any

229

See In re Legislative Redistricting of State, 475 A.2d 428, 445 (Md. 1982) (characterizing concept of “communit[y] of interest” as “nebulous” and “unworkable”); Gardner, Representation Without Party, supra note 27, at 937-38 (noting that “community of
interest” is used “so broadly and indiscriminately as to include virtually any group of
people who share some trait or characteristic that has the potential to be salient politically” and “is not linked in any particular way to a specific piece of territory”).
230
See GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 100-07, 190 (1991); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Localism and Legal Theory (pt. 2), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 353-54 (1990).
231
See BAKER, supra note 85, at 102 (“Economic and social interests usually transcend county and even state lines.”); BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 49, at 70; DANIEL J.
ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN MOSAIC: THE IMPACT OF SPACE, TIME, AND CULTURE ON AMERICAN POLITICS 289 (1994) (“[I]n many cases, the limits of specific civil communities may
be less easily discovered within formal political boundaries.”); HANSON, supra note 49,
at 130 (“[P]olitical subdivisions . . . are quite likely to fail to reflect . . . a community of
interest . . . .”).
232
Cf., e.g., Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 575 (Cal. 1992) (giving “precedence to
keeping geographically compact minority groups together rather than maintain[ing]
city boundaries”).
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one time—from personal to small group, to a parochial localism . . . to
233
Quite specific groups can therefore form
a broader regionalism.”
state house (or even smaller-scale) districts, while broader communities can be captured by state senate districts, and yet more diffuse
groups by congressional districts. The particularity of the community
that comprises a given district typically varies in accordance with the
234
district’s size.
Examples illustrating these definitional points abound in state and
federal law. The significance of geographic demarcation (the first element of a territorial community) is conveyed by the Supreme Court’s
racial redistricting cases. According to the Court, far-flung, noncontiguous groups of minority voters—like the Hispanics along the Mexican border and in Austin in LULAC, and the African Americans
scattered across North Carolina in Shaw I—do not constitute cogniza235
Because of their lack of geographic connectedble communities.
ness, they do not warrant their own districts under section 2 of the
VRA, and the Equal Protection Clause may well be violated if they are
236
placed within the same constituencies.
These decisions also demonstrate some of the shared interests that
can give rise to genuine communities (the second element). Race alone

233

Knight, supra note 58, at 515; see also ELAZAR, supra note 231, at 3; MORRILL, supra note 58, at 23; Robert J. Chaskin, Perspectives on Neighborhood and Community: A Review of the Literature, 71 SOC. SERVICE REV. 521, 535 (1997) (“[T]he units in which the
circumstances and activities of daily life inhere can be ‘nested,’ where each member of
a community is simultaneously a member of others.”).
234
See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793 (1973) (noting that “congressional districts are not so intertwined and freighted with strictly local interests as are state legislative districts”); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor,
624 A.2d 323, 345 (Vt. 1993) (observing that it is “difficult, if not impossible, to achieve
the same level of common interests among individual towns within Senate districts that
is attainable among towns within House districts”). The implication is that legislatures
composed of smaller districts (e.g., state houses) would focus on specific localized concerns, while legislatures composed of larger districts (e.g., Congress) would devote
more attention to broader and more diffuse issues.
235
See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 442 (2006); Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
236
See supra subsections II.C.2-3; see also Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204,
1218 (Alaska 1983) (Matthews, J., concurring) (noting that town belonged to different
community than rest of district, despite similar economic interests, where it was located
“700 miles and two time zones away”); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly,
828 P.2d 185, 195 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (criticizing district that combined unconnected counties on opposite sides of Continental Divide).
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is never enough, in the Court’s view, but race plus cultural isolation (as
with the Hispanics in San Antonio’s Barrio in White), or race plus urban
poverty (as with the Tampa Bay African Americans in Lawyer), can suf237
fice. Outside the Court’s case law, it is common socioeconomic interests that are most often thought to generate communities. California’s
constitution, for instance, specifies that a territorial community can be
“an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area,”
or an “area[] in which the people share similar living stand238
Analogously, lower
ards . . . [or] have similar work opportunities.”
239
courts have recognized communities such as Alaskan fishing villages,
240
241
rural farmland in Oregon, ski towns in the Rockies, industrial areas
242
243
in California, bedroom suburbs of Denver and San Francisco, and
244
the urban cores of several major cities. Additional factors the courts
have deemed relevant to community formation include transportation
245
246
links between areas, membership in regional organizations, the
247
level of residents’ commercial interaction, and their degree of reli248
ance on the same media outlets.

237

See Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997); White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973). These cases also underscore the distinction between a community of interest and a territorial community. People of the same race are clearly a
community of interest, but they are not a territorial community (which may prevail in a
section 2 challenge and defeat a racial gerrymandering claim) unless they also live near
one another, share non-racial interests, and feel subjectively unified.
238
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
239
See Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 879 n.65 (Alaska 1974).
240
See Ater v. Keisling, 819 P.2d 296, 303 n.10 (Or. 1991).
241
See Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642, 652 (Colo. 2002).
242
See Legislature of Cal. v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 29 (Cal. 1973).
243
See Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 93 (D. Colo. 1982); Reinecke, 516 P.2d at 31.
244
See, e.g., Carstens, 543 F. Supp. at 96 (Denver); Groh, 526 P.2d at 879-80 (Anchorage); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 581, 583, 587, 588 (Cal. 1992) (San Francisco, Sacramento, Los Angeles, and San Diego).
245
See, e.g., Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1363 (Alaska 1987);
Hartung v. Bradbury, 33 P.3d 972, 982-83 (Or. 2001).
246
See, e.g., In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141, 145 (Alaska 2002); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 340 (Vt.
1993).
247
See, e.g., Kenai, 743 P.2d at 1362-63; In re Reapportionment of Towns of Woodbury & Worcester, 861 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Vt. 2004).
248
See, e.g., Bingham Cnty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863,
870 (Idaho 2002); Hartung, 33 P.3d at 982.
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Finally, with regard to subjective affiliation (the third element of a
territorial community), a number of cases have highlighted its importance and shown that it does not always coincide with objective interests. In Arizona, for example, the neighboring Navajo and Hopi
tribes share many socioeconomic concerns but are also historical adversaries with clashing identities; accordingly, they have long been
249
Similarly, in Colorado,
placed in different congressional districts.
adjacent Pueblo and El Paso Counties resemble each other in several
respects, but nevertheless do not comprise an authentic community
250
because they are “commercial rivals” and “hereditary enemies.”
Conversely, the Hispanics in the original Texas district in LULAC
(which the Court endorsed) were just as heterogeneous as the Hispan251
The first
ics in the new district (which the Court struck down).
group, however, was far more “cohesive and politically active”—that is,
252
a far more subjectively unified community.
B. Doctrinal Details
Armed with a clearer understanding of what one is, how should a
court go about deciding whether a district does or does not disrupt a
territorial community? In my view, there are three types of disruption
that the court should consider: fusion, fragmentation, and subversion.
Any of these should be enough to invalidate a district, but the court
should be relatively deferential toward any explanation offered by the
State as to how the district in fact corresponds to a community. The
court should also keep in mind that the one-person, one-vote rule
makes inevitable a certain amount of community disruption—but that
this disruption can and should be minimized by intelligent district
drawing.

249

See Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F. Supp. 684, 690 (D.
Ariz. 1992); Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 121 P.3d 843, 868, 871 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
250
Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 92 (D. Colo. 1982); see also Carpenter v.
Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1215 (Alaska 1983) (invalidating district that combined
communities similar in their interests but “completely separate” in their “social activity”).
251
LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 432 (2006).
252
Id. at 441.
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The first kind of disruption is fusion: the needless placement of
different territorial communities within the same district. Fusion is
what occurred in LULAC when Hispanics along the Mexican border
and in Austin were joined together even though they were “distant,
253
disparate communities.” It was also fusion when African Americans
from North Carolina’s “tobacco country, financial centers, and manu254
facturing areas” were merged in Shaw I, and when blacks in Atlanta,
Savannah, and coastal Chatham County—“260 miles apart in distance
255
and worlds apart in culture”—were lumped together in Miller. In all
256
three cases, of course, the Court struck down the offending districts.
The second type of disruption is fragmentation: the unnecessary division of a territorial community among multiple districts. Fragmentation took place in LULAC when the cohesive Hispanic community that
previously had been placed in a single district was dispersed among
several new districts in order to protect an endangered incumbent pol257
itician. Fragmentation also occurred in the 1977 case of United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey when a group of Hasidic
Jews in Brooklyn was split between two state assembly and two state
258
senate districts. While a divided Court ruled against the Hasidim (in
a period prior to the Court’s recognition of a cause of action for racial
259
gerrymandering), Chief Justice Burger wrote in dissent that “members of an ethnic community” have “the constitutional right not to be
260
carved up” for another group’s benefit.
The final kind of disruption is subversion: the creation of a district
that diverges sharply from the defining characteristics of the larger
community in which it is located. Communities are not perfectly uni-

253

Id. at 434.
Shaw I , 509 U.S. 630, 635 (1993).
255
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 908 (1995). According to my survey of the case
law, fusion is the kind of community disruption that has most often led state courts to
invalidate districts.
256
See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 442; Miller, 515 U.S. at 927; Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 649.
257
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435, 439.
258
430 U.S. 144, 152 (1977).
259
Id. at 167-68.
260
Id. at 186 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Hasidim also lost because they did not
advance an explicit community-based claim to their own district. See id. at 154 n.14
(majority opinion). In the state courts, fragmentation is a less common basis for invalidating a district than fusion.
254
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form in their spatial composition, meaning that it is sometimes possible to draw districts that fit entirely within them but that deviate dramatically from their overall tenor. In Bush, for example, a largely
integrated area around Houston was sliced by highly convoluted lines
261
into one majority-black district and one majority-Hispanic district.
These boundaries subverted what was a genuinely mixed community
into two unrepresentative halves. Similarly, in the 1960 case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the city border of Tuskegee, Alabama was converted
from a square into an “uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” that careful262
A biracial area was thus transly separated white and black voters.
formed into a white city and a black hinterland. The Court invalidated
263
the schemes in both cases.
Presented with a claim that a territorial community has been disrupted, a court should display reasonable deference toward the State’s
justification for the challenged district. Such respect is appropriate,
first, because there is—notwithstanding this Article’s efforts in the previous Section—a fair amount of fuzziness in the concept of a territorial
community. When a State is able to mount a solid case that a district
corresponds to a community, relying on evidence contemporaneous
with the district’s creation, it follows that judges should uphold the
district even if they disagree personally as to the degree of districtcommunity congruence. Judicial restraint is also necessary in order to
reduce the potential invasiveness of the territorial community test.
Were judges free to strike down every district that, in their considered
view, failed to adhere to a community, a large number of districts
would end up on thin ice. Limiting the test to cases where the State
cannot present a credible defense preserves legislative authority over
redistricting and focuses the doctrine on severe instances of community
disruption.
For precisely these reasons, state courts that employ something
akin to the territorial community test universally have adopted quite

261

Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 975 (1996) (plurality opinion).
364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960); see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 59 (1964)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing “zigzag, tortuous lines [that were] drawn to concentrate Negroes and Puerto Ricans in Manhattan’s Eighteenth Congressional District
and practically to exclude them from the Seventeenth”). I have not found any state
cases invalidating districts because of community subversion.
263
See Bush, 517 U.S. at 976, 983; Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347-48.
262
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deferential standards of review. They invalidate districts only when they
find clear constitutional or statutory violations, and not when they merely quarrel with the legislature’s reasoned explanations for its district
drawing choices. In Vermont, for instance, the state supreme court
has stated that “it is primarily the Legislature, not this Court, that must
make the necessary compromises to effectuate state constitutional
264
goals.” The court is willing to strike down districts only when plaintiffs demonstrate “the absence of a rational or legitimate basis for the
265
challenged plan[].” Similarly, Colorado’s supreme court has characterized its review as “narrow” and commented that “we should not substitute our judgment for the Commission’s unless we are convinced the
266
Commission departed from constitutional criteria.” These statements
are consistent with my view of how the territorial community test
should operate.
A related issue for a court applying the test is that districts and
communities can never coincide perfectly thanks to the one-person,
one-vote rule. Communities, of course, do not come in populations
that are tidy multiples of the ideal district size, meaning that some degree of community disruption is inevitable whenever districts are drawn.
This disruption, however, can and should be minimized by savvy district drawing. For example, when smaller communities must be combined in order to form a sufficiently populous district, groups that are
as similar as possible in their interests and affiliations should be
joined. Analogously, when a larger community must be divided into
multiple districts, these districts should either correspond to more
specific subcommunities, if they exist, or else mirror the characteristics
267
The point is that the needless fusion,
of the broader community.

264

In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
323, 326 (Vt. 1993).
265
Id. at 327.
266
In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 194, 197 (Colo.
1982); see also Graham v. Thornburgh, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1292 (D. Kan. 2002)
(adopting deferential review standard); Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 121415 (Alaska 1983) (same); Ater v. Keisling, 819 P.2d 296, 303 (Or. 1991) (same); Parella
v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1256 (R.I. 2006) (same).
267
See Backstrom et al., supra note 22, at 153 (discussing how principle of community preservation can be deployed both when communities must be split and when they
must be combined).
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fragmentation, and subversion of communities should be avoided, so
that the one-person, one-vote rule does not result in more community
268
ruptures than are necessary.
The case law provides numerous illustrations of how this can be
done. Presented with an island borough that was too small to support
its own state house district, for instance, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that it should be combined with a nearby lake region rather than
an adjacent peninsula. The court’s rationale was that the island and
the lake region were more closely related thanks to their municipal
269
ties and involvement in commercial fishing. Similarly, a federal district court in Colorado that was forced to divide Denver because it was
too large for a single congressional district severed the city’s southwest
corner and thereby left it “more compact” and with its “minority and
270
The court also merged small
neighborhood communities” intact.
Denver suburbs and split counties (where it had no other option) based
on “the stark contrast between the concerns of the expanding munici271
This is the sort of sensible dispalities and the outlying rural areas.”

268

The larger population variances allowed by the Court for state legislative districts would reduce the community disruption caused by the one-person, one-vote rule
at this level. See supra subsection II.C.1. The disruption would be greater at the congressional redistricting level, at which essentially no population deviations are permitted.
See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1983).
The disruptive impact of the one-person, one-vote rule could also be reduced
through the use of floterial districts. These are districts that overlay (or “float above”)
multiple conventional districts, providing additional representation to voters whose districts would otherwise be overpopulated. For instance, a community whose population
entitles it to 1.5 representatives could be kept intact in a single conventional district with
a single representative, while also being included in a larger floterial district that includes other overpopulated conventional districts. See generally Gary F. Moncrief, Floterial
Districts, Reapportionment, and the Puzzle of Representation, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 251 (1989).
269
In re 2001 Redististricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141, 145 (Alaska 2002); see also id. (ensuring that each portion of community that was divided between two districts was “integrated, as nearly as practicable, with the district in which it [was] placed”).
270
Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 87, 96 (D. Colo. 1982).
271
Id. at 96-97; see also O’Sullivan v. Brier, 540 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (D. Kan. 1982)
(labeling as its “lodestar” the goal of “grouping together . . . as many major communities . . . as possible” while still complying with one-person, one-vote rule); Beauprez v.
Avalos, 42 P.3d 642, 652 (Colo. 2002) (choosing most logical Colorado west slope
counties to merge with Denver suburbs); Ater, 819 P.2d at 303 n.10 (using “best of the
available choices” when forced to split an Oregon county); In re Reapportionment of
Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 336 (Vt. 1993) (noting approvingly that district line that divided Vermont town “was drawn to separate [its] most urban
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trict drawing, attentive to both population figures and communal ties,
that courts should expect (and require) from legislatures.
A final point about the territorial community test is that it need
not serve as the judiciary’s only tool for combating political gerrymandering. In fact, because it focuses on specific districts’ congruence with
communities, it could be complemented effectively by standards that
aim to cure statewide pathologies. The two obvious candidates, both
discussed earlier, are measures of district competitiveness and gauges
272
of how fairly a district plan treats the two major parties.
While my
position remains that the territorial community test is more consistent
with the American commitment to geographic districting than these
approaches, I certainly have no objection to their adoption alongside
it. Political gerrymandering is a wily enough foe that it may well take a
set of standards to subdue.
C. Relation to Other Domains
It should be clear by now that there are many similarities between
the territorial community test and the existing bodies of state and federal law that regulate redistricting. State legislative districts that correspond to political subdivisions (which themselves often coincide with
territorial communities) are permitted to deviate substantially from
273
the population otherwise dictated by the one-person, one-vote rule.
Minority groups that constitute territorial communities are commonly
entitled to districts in which they can elect the candidates of their
274
Majority-minority districts that
choice under section 2 of the VRA.
mirror territorial communities are essentially immune from claims

areas from [more rural] neighborhoods”); CAIN, supra note 22, at 63-64, 72 (discussing
examples of California communities that could sensibly be combined by districts); Gardner, Possibility of Community, supra note 27, at 1258-59 (suggesting that if a community
must be divided, its “core” should be preserved and its “hinterlands” sacrificed).
272
See supra subsections I.B.2-3. To the extent that these approaches conflict with
the territorial community test—if, for example, lower bias and higher responsiveness
could be achieved only by disrupting more communities—I would want the value of
community preservation to take precedence over other redistricting goals. But I would
have no problem with a district plan that complies with the territorial community test
being struck down for other reasons.
273
See supra subsection II.C.1.
274
See supra subsection II.C.2.
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that they are unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. And many states
already abide by constitutional or statutory requirements that their
276
districts respect territorial community boundaries.
Accordingly, were the territorial community test adopted as a
means of curbing political gerrymandering, much of the law of redistricting would be elegantly harmonized. The same core inquiry—the
degree to which electoral districts and territorial communities coincide—would help determine: (1) whether districts can diverge from
perfect equipopulation; (2) whether section 2 of the VRA has been
violated; (3) whether districts are unlawful racial gerrymanders; (4)
whether certain state redistricting rules have been followed; and (5)
whether impermissible political gerrymandering has taken place.
Judges and scholars who value coherence in the law should welcome
such doctrinal convergence, particularly given the confusion that has
277
long reigned in the redistricting realm.
The benefits of convergence also would not be merely aesthetic.
Parties responsible for crafting districts, who often complain about the
plethora of applicable requirements, would have a single, straightforward directive with which to comply (in addition to the one-person,
one-vote rule): that districts should correspond as closely as possible
to territorial communities. As long as this mandate was satisfied, state
legislative districts could deviate somewhat from perfect population
equality, and all districts would be largely insulated from VRA section
2, racial gerrymandering, certain state law, and political gerrymandering challenges. The legal uncertainty that surrounds most contemporary district plans would be substantially reduced.
As for the courts, they would presumably find fewer breaches of
the redistricting rules once district drawers fully grasped the need for
district-community congruence. Districts designed to comply with the
territorial community test, of course, would typically violate neither it
nor any other requirement. Moreover, when the courts did find
breaches, they would often be able to avoid framing their decisions in

275
276
277

See supra subsection II.C.3.
See supra subsection II.C.5.
See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text.
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278

inflammatory racial terms.
Much of the redistricting case law currently revolves around racial issues because several key causes of action
(e.g., racial vote dilution and racial gerrymandering) are race-related.
But since districts that offend section 2 of the VRA or the prohibition
on racial gerrymandering also frequently run afoul of the territorial
community test, they could be struck down, in many cases, on communal grounds alone. Incendiary claims about discrimination and
racial motivation might thus be limited at the same time that the doctrine’s overall coherence would be enhanced.
IV. MEASURING MANAGEABILITY
The Supreme Court’s rationale in Vieth and LULAC for rejecting
all of the potential standards that it considered was not that it deemed
them deficient on the merits. The Court’s justification, rather, was
that none of the standards was sufficiently “judicially discernible and
279
manageable.” None of the standards, in other words, could give rise
to decisions that would be “principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions”—and therefore the whole field of political gerrymandering, according to the Vieth plurality, represented a
280
nonjusticiable political question.
Vieth and LULAC impose a heavy burden on anyone who proposes
a new standard for curbing political gerrymandering. The standard
not only must be sound as a matter of constitutional law, but, in contrast to the array of approaches the Court already has evaluated, it also
must be judicially workable. This burden is particularly weighty for the
territorial community test since the objection most commonly posed
to it is that community boundaries (let alone how well they match up
281
with district lines) cannot be reliably determined.
This Part, then, takes on the challenge of demonstrating that the
territorial community test is manageable. I first argue that the test

278

See Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 638-41 (discussing “perverse incentives” created
by Supreme Court decisions “encourag[ing] the racialization of all claims of improper
manipulation of the redistricting process”).
279
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also LULAC,
548 U.S. 399, 417-20 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
280
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278.
281
See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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avoids the problem that has led the Court to find every other approach wanting: the judiciary’s alleged inability to assess partisan motives and outcomes. I next discuss the courts’ experiences to date with
standards similar to my own. My conclusion is that both the Supreme
Court and the state courts have had no particular difficulty ascertaining community boundaries or comparing them to district configurations. I then explore the relevant political science literature, which
also shows that communities can be identified and that districtcommunity congruence can be measured. Finally, I contend that any
remaining vagueness is actually beneficial because it would encourage
risk-averse district drawers to avoid provocative district plans.
A. Sidestepping the Problem
In both Vieth and LULAC, the Court dismissed as unmanageable all
the standards that it considered for the same two reasons: (1) they
required the courts to make impossible evaluations of the political
motives underlying district plans; or else (2) they asked the courts to
decide whether specific electoral outcomes were sufficiently “fair.” For
instance, the predominant-partisan-intent tests advanced by appellants
in both cases, as well as by Justice Stevens, were deemed unworkable
because the Court could see no way to determine whether partisanship
282
Similarly,
in fact outweighed all other redistricting considerations.
Justice Souter’s emphasis on partisans’ “packing” or “cracking,” and
Justice Breyer’s minority-party-entrenchment standard, were considered untenable because people’s political affiliations are changeable
283
and there is no way to tell how much power a party should have.
“‘Fairness,’” declared the Vieth plurality, “does not seem to us a judi284
cially manageable standard.”
Whatever one may think of these critiques, they plainly leave the
territorial community test unscathed. Unlike the standards assessed in
Vieth and LULAC, it does not require the courts to determine how par-

282

See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 417-19 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284-86,
292-95 (plurality opinion); id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[C]ourts must be cautious about adopting a standard that turns on whether the partisan interests in the redistricting process were excessive.”).
283
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286-90, 296-97, 299-301 (plurality opinion).
284
Id. at 291.

Stephanopoulos FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

1444

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

4/9/2012 1:31 PM

[Vol. 160: 1379

tisan district drawers’ motives are—or even to adjudge intent at all.
Also unlike those standards, it does not necessitate any analysis of voters’ political affiliations or parties’ levels of electoral success. Instead,
the territorial community test focuses exclusively on where geographic
communities are located and how well electoral districts correspond to
them. These sorts of questions, which avoid partisan motives and outcomes altogether, have never been held by the Court to be judicially
unanswerable. They are nowhere to be found in the “sea of impon285
derables” bemoaned by the Vieth plurality.
B. The Supreme Court’s Experience
Not only has the Court never declared the territorial community
test to be unworkable, but it has successfully employed something similar to it in a wide range of cases. In these decisions, the Court has frequently, and without any obvious hardship, identified the bound-aries
of geographic communities and reached well-reasoned conclusions as
to whether they were disrupted by district plans. While these conclusions have not always been unanimous, no Justice has ever complained
that the inquiry itself is somehow beyond the judiciary’s ability. The
Court’s own experience thus provides compelling evidence that the
territorial community test is manageable.
In the reapportionment context, first, at least five of the Court’s
decisions have determined that towns or counties comprised distinct
communities, and that districts corresponding to these units could, for
286
this reason, diverge substantially from perfect population equality.
While the Justices have disagreed as to whether population deviations
should be allowed in the first place, no Justice has claimed that it is
impossible to tell whether political subdivisions amount to genuine
communities. Even Justice Brennan, the Court’s most ardent champion of the one-person, one-vote rule, conceded in a 1983 opinion that a
“longstanding policy of using counties as the basic units of representation” could be applied “rational[ly]” and without “arbitrariness or dis287
crimination.”

285
286
287

Id. at 290.
See supra subsection II.C.1.
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 853 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Similarly, the Court has considered whether minority groups constitute territorial communities (and hence require districts of their
288
own) in close to ten racial vote dilution cases. These decisions have
split almost evenly between holdings in favor of and holdings against
the minority groups. In some of the decisions in their favor, the Court
recognized territorial communities such as Mexican American resi289
dents of San Antonio’s Barrio, poor African Americans in rural
290
291
Georgia, and politically mobilized Latinos in southwestern Texas.
In some of the adverse decisions, the Court held that assorted minori292
ties around Minneapolis, and geographically scattered African Amer293
294
295
icans in Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas, did not qualify as
coherent communities. Never in any of these cases did the Court express any existential angst about the inquiry it was conducting. Indeed, in a recent vote dilution decision, the Justices were able both to
ascertain the boundaries of a Texas Latino community, and to conclude that the old district lines corresponded to them while the new
296
lines did not. If this sort of analysis is unworkable, there is no hint of
it in the case law.
Nor is there any sign of trouble in the Court’s racial gerrymandering decisions, of which another ten or so have examined whether districts coincided with territorial communities in order to assess claims
297
that the districts were created for primarily racial reasons.
In these
decisions too, the Court repeatedly has shown itself capable of evaluating community boundaries as well as district-community congruence.
For instance, the Court struck down a North Carolina district that
298
combined African Americans from across the state, a Georgia district

288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298

See supra subsection II.C.2.
See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768-70 (1973).
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626-27 (1982).
See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 435, 438-41 (2006).
See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41-42 (1993).
See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91-92 (1997).
See Shaw II , 517 U.S. 899, 916-18 (1996).
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979-81 (1996) (plurality opinion).
See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435, 438-41.
See supra subsection II.C.3.
See Shaw I , 509 U.S. 630, 647-49 (1993).
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that joined blacks in inland cities and rural coastal areas, and racially
homogeneous Texas districts carved out of racially integrated re300
On the other hand, the Court upheld a Tampa Bay district
gions.
301
composed of poor urban African Americans and a revised North
Carolina district that confined itself to urban centers in the Pied302
mont. Nothing would seem to differentiate these cases (at least in
terms of judicial manageability) from the rest of the Court’s equal protection docket. Their outcomes, reflecting the consistent application
of something akin to the territorial community test, appear just as
303
“principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions” as those
of any other constitutional cases.
To be sure, the Justices have sometimes disagreed about questions
of community in these decisions. In Bush, for example, Justice Stevens
argued in dissent that the Dallas district rejected by the Court in fact
had been “drawn to align with certain communities of interest, such as
304
The
land use, family demographics, and transportation corridors.”
plurality was unpersuaded because the legislature had not considered
this information when it drew the district and the district correlated
305
better with racial than community lines. In LULAC, similarly, Chief
Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that the State’s proposed remedial district (which the majority disallowed) was just as attentive to
Texas Latino communities as the original district that the state dis306
The majority conceded that the districts were similar in
mantled.
several respects, but held that the original district corresponded to a
307
more politically cohesive Latino group.
For present purposes, it is unimportant who had the better of these
disputes. The key point, rather, is that they are no different from the
disagreements that characterize all non-unanimous Court decisions.

299

See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 908-09, 919-20 (1995).
See Bush, 517 U.S. at 966, 971 n.*, 975.
301
See Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581-83 (1997).
302
See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 544, 553-54 (1999).
303
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion).
304
Bush, 517 U.S. at 1026 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
305
See id. at 966-67 (plurality opinion).
306
LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 504-05 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
307
See id. at 435, 438-41 (majority opinion).
300
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As with any standard less determinate than one-person, one-vote,
judges applying the territorial community test will occasionally reach
different conclusions with regard to the same sets of facts. But this
reality does not make the test unmanageable; it simply makes it par for
the constitutional course.
C. The State Courts’ Experience
A skeptic might point out that almost all of the Court’s experience
with the territorial community test has involved racial communities.
Perhaps these communities are easier to identify and to compare to
district lines than communities oriented along other axes. The skeptic
might add that district-community congruence is not the central issue in
either racial vote dilution or racial gerrymandering doctrine. Perhaps
the Court would have more trouble with the territorial community test
if it were the dispositive inquiry rather than a subsidiary consideration.
These (perfectly valid) concerns are largely allayed by the experiences of the state courts. In a series of cases spanning four decades,
these courts have frequently recognized geographic communities that
were defined by non-racial criteria. They also have repeatedly examined whether districts corresponded to these communities—not as a
subprong of some other standard, but rather as the core element of
their political gerrymandering analysis. The body of doctrine produced by these decisions is substantively rich; it has led to both the
affirmation and invalidation of challenged districts (usually unanimously); it has evolved, in classic common law fashion, through the
refinement of earlier precedent; and it has almost never been denounced as unworkable.
By my count, courts in at least ten states, in at least twenty-two decisions over the past four redistricting cycles, have evaluated at least
308
fifty districts based on their congruence with territorial communities.
About two-thirds of these districts were upheld, while about one-third
309
were struck down. About two-thirds of the decisions also were unan-

308
309

See supra subsection II.C.5.
See supra subsection II.C.5.
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imous, while only three were decided even in part by bare majorities.
That so many districts have been assessed under the territorial community test, yielding both affirmations and invalidations, and typically
by lopsided margins, strongly suggests that the test is judicially man311
An unmanageable approach, in all likelihood, would not
ageable.
have survived as long or generated as much consensus with regard to
312
results on both sides of the doctrinal line.
A closer examination of the state case law sheds light on the factors that most often prove decisive for districts’ fates. That such generalizations are possible itself bolsters the case for the test’s workability.
On the one hand, districts typically were struck down when it was clear
to the reviewing courts that they merged unrelated communities or
divided what plainly were unified communities. Some examples of
313
community fusion and fragmentation were noted earlier. Others include an Alaska district that joined the “physically and economically
314
segregated” town of Cordova with the Inside Passage region; another
Alaska district that “mixe[d] small, rural, Native communities with the
315
urban areas of Ketchikan and Sitka”; two Denver districts that “split[]
316
the Five Points community along its main business route”; and two
North Carolina districts that separated a county seat from the rest of
317
the jurisdiction. In many of these cases, the state was unable to produce any proof that community boundaries had been respected (or

310

See Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1983) (3-2 majority); In re
Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1992) (one out of seven
challenged districts upheld by 4-3 majority); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323 (Vt. 1993) (one out of five challenged districts struck down by 3-2 majority).
311
As does the fact that both state and lower federal courts have frequently drawn
districts so that they correspond to territorial communities. See supra note 211.
312
Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 280-81 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding
Bandemer standard unmanageable in part because it always resulted in districts being
upheld).
313
See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
314
Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1215.
315
Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 51 (Alaska 1993).
316
In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Colo. 1982).
317
Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247, 253-54 (N.C. 2003).
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318

even considered). Often, it was apparent that the basis for the state’s
district drawing choices had been political advantage rather than
319
community preservation.
Conversely, the state courts have generally upheld districts when
there was reasonable evidence of district-community congruence and
this evidence was actually taken into account by the redistricting body.
Some common types of evidence have included shared economic pursuits, similar income levels, significant social and commercial interaction, good transportation links, reliance on the same media outlets,
320
and common membership in regional organizations. Presented with
such evidence, the courts have typically rejected gerrymandering challenges even when the plaintiffs were able to mount plausible cases of
321
The courts have emphasized, however, that
community disruption.
the evidence should have been compiled and consulted at the time the
districts were formed—not introduced later in the heat of litigation. It
was significant in a number of cases that the district drawers themselves considered community boundaries and gave reasons for their
322
Absent such a contemporaneous record, the districts may
actions.
well have been struck down.

318

See, e.g., Hickel, 846 P.2d at 53-54 (noting that district was drawn with “little consideration of the relative socio-economic integration of the people who live there”);
Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1215 (pointing out that “record [was] simply devoid of evidence”
that communities were related); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828
P.2d 185, 195-96 (Colo. 1992) (concluding that Colorado Reapportionment Commission could not provide “adequate factual showing” for its districting choices).
319
See, e.g., Hickel, 846 P.2d at 51 (asserting that district plan raised “specter of gerrymandering”); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 213 (Colo.
1982) (noting “partisan political nature of the Commission’s action”).
320
See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
321
See, e.g., Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1362-63 (Alaska 1987)
(upholding district despite constituent areas’ “minimal” interaction because of their
economic ties, transport links, and shared media outlets); In re Reapportionment of
Towns of Woodbury & Worcester, 861 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Vt. 2004) (same where “petitioners’ preferences and the bulk of their interests may indeed fall outside their current district” but “findings also include substantial ties” within district).
322
See, e.g., In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d at 197; In re Petition
of Stephan, 836 P.2d 574, 581-82 (Kan. 1992); Hartung v. Bradbury, 33 P.3d 972, 98185 (Or. 2001); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor,
624 A.2d 323, 339-45 (Vt. 1993).
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A different kind of confirmation of the territorial community test’s
manageability can be gleaned from the case law of Alaska (the state with
the most extensive experience with it). Over four decades, in quintessential common law fashion, the Alaskan courts have cited their earlier
precedents, refined them, and relied on them to determine the outcomes that different fact patterns should produce. That the territorial
community test can generate such a familiar sort of doctrine shows that
it is no more vague or indeterminate than most legal standards.
The Alaska Supreme Court first used the test in 1974, permitting
population deviations for districts that coincided with communities
323
In the court’s next
and prohibiting them for districts that did not.
redistricting decision, in 1983, it looked to its earlier case for the applicable standard of review as well as the definition of the relevant
324
Four years later, the court carefully anaconstitutional provision.
lyzed its earlier precedents to decide how to resolve challenges to
three districts. Noting that district validity “can be determined by way
of comparison with districts which we have previously [examined],”
the court concluded that a district combining two Anchorage suburbs
was “[u]nlike the district linking Cordova and the Southeast which we
invalidated in [1983],” but “[l]ike the Juneau District upheld in
325
[1974].” By 1992, the court had an even deeper pool of precedents
to draw from—deep enough that it could start specifying the hallmarks of sound and unsound districts. “In our previous reapportionment decisions we have identified several specific characteristics of
[permissible districts],” the court explained, cataloging factors such as
“common major economic activity,” “the predominantly Native character of the populace,” “historical economic links,” and “transportation
326
ties.” Through the alchemy of the common law, a delphic constitutional command had become a detailed doctrinal infrastructure for
deciding cases.

323

See Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 879-80 (Alaska 1974).
See Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1214 (Alaska 1983).
325
Kenai, 743 P.2d at 1363; see also id. at 1360 (contrasting unified Juneau district
with “the division of relatively similar districts in Anchorage that we rejected in Groh”);
id. at 1361 (“Like the Juneau District upheld in Groh, District 2 effectuates a rational
state policy . . . .”).
326
Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 46-47 (Alaska 1992); see also In re 2001
Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141, 145 (Alaska 2002) (citing Hickel, 846 P.2d at 51 n.20).
324
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Some further support for the territorial community test’s workability stems from the kinds of disagreements that it has produced. As
noted above, courts applying the test have not disagreed much; most
decisions have been unanimous and only a handful have deeply divid327
When judges have come to different coned the reviewing judges.
clusions, moreover, they usually have done so for the most ordinary of
reasons: diverging views on whether certain facts satisfy a legal standard. An Alaska judge, for example, objected to a district’s invalidation
because, while a “close question,” he thought “it seem[ed] relatively
reasonable to include Cordova with the other waterlocked fishing
328
Similarly, Colorado judges quarreled over whether
communities.”
the division of certain communities was unavoidable due to the oneperson, one-vote rule (while agreeing that the division was regrett329
able). Only once, in the case law that I surveyed, did I find any claim
that the territorial community test is particularly difficult to apply. A
Vermont judge labeled it “vague and tentative” and criticized its
“breadth and imprecision”—but nevertheless used it to analyze the
330
validity of six districts, dissenting only as to one.
D. The Political Science Literature
While the courts’ own experiences are the most persuasive proof
of the territorial community test’s manageability, the political science
literature offers some additional confirmation. Political scientists have
managed to identify geographic communities both directly, through
the analysis of large volumes of socioeconomic and survey data, and
indirectly, through the use of proxies such as political subdivisions and
media markets. Political scientists also have successfully quantified
district-community congruence, again utilizing the subdivision and

327

See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
Carpenter, 667 P.2d at 1222 (Compton, J., dissenting).
329
See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 210-11 (Colo.
1992) (Mullarky, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
330
In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
323, 349 (Vt. 1993) (Dooley, J., concurring and dissenting). It is worth noting that the
Vermont statute is more “vague” and “imprecis[e]” than my conception of the territorial community test. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 1903(b)(2) (2002) (requiring districts
to be drawn to achieve “recognition and maintenance of patterns of geography, social
interaction, trade, political ties and common interests”).
328
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market proxies. These techniques demonstrate that the territorial
community test can be employed not just qualitatively but also with
331
some social scientific rigor.
An important effort to identify communities directly was recently
332
completed by Dante Chinni and James Gimpel. Chinni and Gimpel
compiled extensive demographic and socioeconomic data for every
county in America: population size, population density, income, oc333
cupation, education, race, ethnicity, age distribution, religion, etc.
They then used a statistical procedure to assign each county to one of
334
These community types, which capture
twelve community types.
much of the country’s diversity, include fast-growing “Boom Towns,”
university-focused “Campus and Careers,” deeply religious “Evangelical
Epicenters,” Hispanic-heavy “Immigration Nation,” urban “Industrial
Metropolis,” struggling “Service Worker Centers,” and agrarian “Tractor
335
Country.” That counties can methodically be classified in this manner
helps show that the task of community identification is tractable.
Equally promising is the CommonCensus Map Project, which asks
respondents to provide their home addresses as well as the “local
community,” “local area,” and major city with which they identify most
336
closely.
Complex algorithms then convert the information into fascinating maps (available at local, regional, and national scales) of
America’s geographic communities, as specified and experienced by

331

Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and
Voting in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2002) (“Law and social science are perhaps nowhere more mutually dependent than in the voting-rights field.”).
332
See DANTE CHINNI & JAMES GIMPEL, OUR PATCHWORK NATION: THE SURPRISING
TRUTH ABOUT THE “REAL” AMERICA (2010). In a sequel to this Article, I also attempt to
identify communities directly using newly available Census data as well as specialized
mapping software. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 32.
333
See CHINNI & GIMPEL, supra note 332, at 222-23.
334
See id. at 223-25.
335
See id. at 9-10. The twelve composite variables used to sort the country’s counties explain seventy to eighty percent of the variance in the underlying data. Id. at 224;
see also Brian A. Mikelbank, A Typology of U.S. Suburban Places, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE
935, 961 (2004) (using similar statistical technique to assign U.S. suburbs to ten different categories); Thomas J. Vicino et al., Megalopolis 50 Years On: The Transformation of a
City Region, 31 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 344, 361-64 (2007) (assigning Census
places in Northeast to five categories).
336
About, COMMONCENSUS MAP PROJECT, http://www.commoncensus.org/about.
php (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
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337

the people themselves. While more data is necessary to create maps
338
that are detailed enough for redistricting, the idea of ascertaining
community boundaries through people’s own subjective affiliations is
potentially very powerful.
Political scientists have also used less precise proxies to determine
339
340
community borders: political subdivisions such as towns, counties,
341
342
and school districts, and media markets for television stations and
343
newspapers.
These entities have the advantage of being easily discernible; political subdivision boundaries can be seen on any map,
while groups such as Nielsen Media Research and Arbitron define
media markets in spatial terms. The entities have the disadvantage, of
course, of not coinciding perfectly with territorial communities; as
noted earlier, the patterns of people’s interests and affiliations do not

337

See The Maps Page, COMMONCENSUS MAP PROJECT, http://www.commoncensus.
org/maps.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2012); see also Matt Chisholm & Ross Cohen,
NEIGHBORHOOD PROJECT, http://hood.theory.org (similar San Francisco project) (last
visited Feb. 15, 2012); cf. Claudia J. Coulton et al., Mapping Residents’ Perceptions of Neighborhood Boundaries: A Methodological Note, 29 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 371, 371-72
(2001) (discussing pilot study mapping Cleveland neighborhoods by surveying their
residents).
338
See FAQ, COMMONCENSUS MAP PROJECT, http://www.commoncensus.org/faq.php
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
339
See Richard G. Niemi et al., The Effects of Congruity Between Community and District
on Salience of U.S. House Candidates, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 187, 198-99 (1986).
340
See Richard N. Engstrom, District Geography and Voters, in REDISTRICTING IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM 65, 74-75 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005); Jonathan Winburn & Michael W. Wagner, Carving Voters Out: Redistricting’s Influence on Political Information,
Turnout, and Voting Behavior, 63 POL. RES. Q. 373, 375 (2010).
341
Cf. William A. Fischel, Neither “Creatures of the State” nor “Accidents of Geography”:
The Creation of American Public School Districts in the Twentieth Century, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
177, 199 (2010).
342
See PAUL GRONKE, THE ELECTORATE, THE CAMPAIGN, AND THE OFFICE: A UNIFIED
APPROACH TO SENATE AND HOUSE ELECTIONS 165-69 (2000); C. DANIELLE VINSON,
LOCAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS: THROUGH LOCAL EYES 25
(2003); James E. Campbell et al., Television Markets and Congressional Elections, 9 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 665, 668-69 (1984); Dena Levy & Peverill Squire, Television Markets and the
Competitiveness of U.S. House Elections, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 313, 316 (2000); Daniel
Lipinski, The Effect of Messages Communicated by Members of Congress: The Impact of Publicizing Votes, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 81, 88-91 (2001); Timothy S. Prinz, Media Markets and Candidate Awareness in House Elections, 1978–1990, 12 POL. COMM. 305, 307 (1995).
343
See Brian F. Schaffner & Patrick J. Sellers, The Structural Determinants of Local Congressional News Coverage, 20 POL. COMM. 41, 46-47 (2003).
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always match up with lines drawn for other reasons. Still, both political subdivisions and media markets are useful starting points for any
attempt to determine community borders, and it is unsurprising that
courts conducting such an inquiry often have relied on—but not lim345
ited themselves to—them.
Unfortunately, Chinni and Gimpel did not try to analyze how well
electoral districts correspond to their twelve community types, nor has
the CommonCensus Map Project compared constituencies to people’s
self-identified communities. Helpfully, however, many of the scholars
who used political subdivisions or media markets as proxies for geographic communities also assessed district-subdivision or districtmarket congruence. Using a variety of statistical techniques, they
managed to quantify the level of congruence of congressional districts
346
across the country, typically on a scale from 0 (low) to 1 (high).
That this sort of measurement can be done is quite significant. It
means that a challenged district’s congruence can be calculated reliably, and then compared to the congruence of other districts in the state
(or nation). While political subdivisions and media markets are not
identical to territorial communities, particularly incongruent districts
are still more likely to disrupt communities, and particularly congruent districts are still more likely to respect them. At the very least, it is
probative whether a district does or does not correspond to subdivisions or markets as well as most of its peers. Courts employing the territorial community test, then, could use comparative congruence data
to bolster their qualitative analysis. The result, presumably, would be
case outcomes that are more consistent and predictable—and doctrine
347
that is more judicially manageable.

344

See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
See supra subsection II.C.5 and Section IV.C (discussing relevant state case law);
see also Jason C. Miller, Community as a Redistricting Principle: Consulting Media Markets in
Drawing District Lines, 86 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1, 6 (2010), http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/
86/86_ JMiller.pdf (arguing that courts should consult media market boundaries when
evaluating district plans).
346
See GRONKE, supra note 342, at 165-69; Campbell et al., supra note 342, at 668-70;
Engstrom, supra note 340, at 74; Levy & Squire, supra note 342, at 316-17; Niemi et al.,
supra note 339, at 192-99; Schaffner & Sellers, supra note 343, at 43; Winburn & Wagner, supra note 340, at 376-77.
347
Cf. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 563-74 (compiling comparative compactness
data for congressional districts that was later relied on by Supreme Court racial gerry345
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E. Lingering Ambiguity
Of course, neither the courts’ experiences nor the efforts of the
political scientists can eliminate all uncertainty regarding the application of the territorial community test. No matter how many cases are
decided under it, and no matter how sophisticated the social scientific
measures become, judges will still need to make tough judgment calls
about community boundaries and district-community congruence.
This remaining imprecision, however, is not necessarily undesirable.
If the Court’s history with racial gerrymandering is any guide, some
lingering ambiguity could actually prove useful by prompting district
drawers to play it safe and avoid provocative district plans.
When the Court first announced in 1993 that districts are invalid if
348
they are drawn for predominantly racial reasons, the new standard
349
was attacked at once for its vagueness.
Critics noted that legislative
intent is very difficult to discern, and that it is more challenging still to
determine whether race overwhelmed all other redistricting considerations. Early returns seemed to bear out these fears. The Court took
case after case in the new doctrinal field, dividing bitterly almost every
time and reaching outcomes that were not easy to reconcile with one
another. By the end of the 1990s, as Justice Souter put it, there was
widespread “confusion in statehouses and courthouses” thanks to the
absence of a “practical standard for distinguishing between the lawful
350
and unlawful use of race.”
But something funny happened in the next redistricting cycle: the
number of racial gerrymandering challenges plummeted, and almost
every such challenge—including the only one considered by the
351
Court—failed.
As Richard Pildes has explained, risk-averse district
drawers, hoping to avoid litigation, largely stopped forming strangely

mandering decisions). A sequel to this Article attempts to measure district-community
congruence directly rather than through proxies such as political subdivisions or media
markets. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 32.
348
See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
349
See, e.g., id. at 670-74 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 685-87 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 57, at 645.
350
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1045 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
351
See Pildes, supra note 21, at 67 & n.174; see also Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,
257-58 (2001).
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shaped majority-minority districts. They “internalized Shaw, not as
barring them from intentionally creating [majority-]minority districts,
but as imposing general, extrinsic limits on the extent to which dis352
The aesthetics of majority-minority
tricts could be noncompact.”
districts thus improved, litigation declined precipitously, and “vague
353
law was transformed into settled practice.”
Though it is impossible to say for sure, a similar story could unfold
if the territorial community test were adopted. At first, court decisions
might be highly controversial, many districts might seem to be in jeopardy, and complaints about the test’s unworkability might abound.
But over time, as in the racial gerrymandering context, risk-averse district drawers would likely internalize the new rule and learn how to
steer clear of litigation. They might form districts that adhere closely
to political subdivisions, or assemble detailed data in order to identify
community boundaries, or document in writing the reasons for their
redistricting choices—all steps not strictly necessary for avoiding liability. In this manner, the territorial community test might end up both
sparsely litigated and strictly enforced thanks to its residual ambiguity.
And while heavy enforcement has its drawbacks in other areas, it is
relatively unproblematic when the activity being curtailed (without
354
excessive judicial involvement) is political gerrymandering.
V. PLAYING POLITICS
If the most common objection to the territorial community test is
355
that it is judicially unmanageable, claims that it would harm Democrats and racial minorities and reduce competitiveness come in a close
356
second. The assumptions underlying these criticisms are that Demo-

352

Pildes, supra note 21, at 68.
Id. at 67-69.
354
See id. at 70 (“[U]nlike gerrymandering in the Shaw context, partisan gerrymandering raises no concern about overenforcement costs.”); cf. Richard L. Hasen, The
Benefits of “Judicially Unmanageable” Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1489, 1503 (2002) (calling for more judicially unmanageable election law standards).
355
See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
356
See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 289 (2004) (plurality opinion); BUCHMAN, supra note 22, at 202; Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 1693; Lowenstein & Steinberg,
supra note 16, at 23; Shapiro, supra note 43, at 238. It should be noted, however, that
353
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cratic and minority voters are especially spatially concentrated, and that
most geographic communities are skewed in a particular party’s favor.
The formation of districts that coincide with communities, then, would
allegedly “pack” Democrats and minorities and render most districts
uncompetitive.
Arguments of this sort, focusing on statewide electoral consequences, have only limited bearing on whether the territorial community test
should be adopted. As laid out in the preceding Parts, my case for the
test is theoretical, historical, and doctrinal—but not overtly political.
That the test may unintentionally help or hurt a party or racial group, or
make elections more or less competitive, is largely irrelevant to its legal
merit. Electoral impact, of course, is not a recognized modality of
357
constitutional interpretation.
Nevertheless, it is plainly good policy for district plans to treat parties
and racial groups fairly and for election outcomes to be responsive to
changes in public opinion. Accordingly, this Part considers the likely
political implications of the territorial community test’s adoption—
and concludes that they are actually quite positive. I first investigate
how partisan bias, electoral responsiveness, minority representation,
and other key variables relate to district-community congruence. Contrary to critics’ expectations, preliminary empirical analysis shows that
bias is lower, responsiveness is higher, and minority representation is
unchanged in states that respect community boundaries when they
redistrict. I then examine the relevant political science literature,
which largely confirms these findings and extends them in several interesting ways. Thus not only does the territorial community test not
injure any party or racial group or reduce competitiveness, but, based on
the available evidence, it appears to do the opposite.
A. Empirical Analysis
In the last redistricting cycle (2001–2010), almost half the states
were required or encouraged to draft state legislative district plans that

most of these criticisms are directed at district compactness, which is not the same thing
as district-community congruence. See supra subsection I.B.1.
357
See BOBBITT, supra note 219, at 12-13 (summarizing modalities of constitutional
argument).
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358

adhered to territorial community boundaries.
Of the twenty-two
community-respect provisions that were in force, four were constitutional, seven were statutory, and eleven were included in non-binding
359
guidelines. Courts in six states had also issued decisions specifically
360
addressing these provisions before the last cycle began. In this Section, I analyze how states that paid heed to community boundaries
over the last decade differed, along several important metrics, from
states that did not. My results help rebut many of the politically rooted
criticisms of the territorial community test.
It is true, of course, that states with community-respect provisions
on their books do not necessarily abide by them. Districts might fail to
correspond to underlying geographic communities even if corre361
spondence is nominally urged or even mandated. Still, the presence
of a community-respect requirement is at least a decent proxy for actual
district-community congruence. Particularly when such a requirement
is legally binding (because it is included in a constitution or statute
rather than a hortatory guideline), and even more so when it previously
has been judicially enforced, one would expect it to have a discernible
362
effect on how closely districts and communities in a state coincide.

358

I examine state legislative rather than congressional elections because (1) many
community-respect provisions apply only to the former; and (2) the smaller number of
congressional districts in most states makes congressional bias and responsiveness calculations less reliable.
359
See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. California is not counted here
because it has not redrawn districts since it adopted its community-respect provision in
2008. Kentucky is not counted because its community-respect provision applies only to
congressional redistricting (though I do count it in the turnout and trust-ingovernment analyses, which are not limited to state elections). North Carolina and
Rhode Island are not counted because they do not have explicit community-respect
provisions. See supra note 192. The states that are counted are reasonably representative of the country as a whole, covering all major geographic regions as well as a wide
array of demographic and socioeconomic environments.
360
They are Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Oregon, and Vermont. See supra
notes 201, 203, 205-06, 208, 210 and accompanying text.
361
See Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting Institutions and Competition in U.S. House
Districts (“It may be that despite these criteria being on the books, there is little enforcement of them . . . .”), in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: MAKING INSTITUTIONS WORK 141, 153 (Margaret Levi et al. eds, 2008).
362
See, e.g., Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 415, 422 (2004) (treating states’ compactness and subdivision preservation requirements as proxies for actual district compactness and respect
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It is also true that the territorial community test does not directly
target bias, responsiveness, or minority representation. The goal of
the test is concededly to optimize district-community congruence, not
to accomplish other laudable policy objectives. However, that the approach may influence the electoral system indirectly (by sharply limit363
ing the discretion of district drawers ) and somewhat coincidentally
(because districts that coincide with communities often happen to
correlate with desirable statewide attributes) is no reason to discount
these consequences. Positive side effects are still positive.
1. Bias and Responsiveness
Beginning with bias and responsiveness, political scientists Bruce
Cain and John Hanley calculated both metrics for fifty legislative
chambers in twenty-six states based on the results of the 2002 elec364
tions. As noted earlier, partisan bias refers to the divergence in the
share of seats that each party would win given the same share of the
365
For example, if Democrats would win 48% of the
statewide vote.
seats with 50% of the vote (in which case Republicans would win 52%
of the seats), then a district plan would have a bias of 2%. Electoral
responsiveness refers to the rate at which a party gains or loses seats
given changes in its statewide vote share. For instance, if Democrats
would win 10% more seats if they received 5% more of the vote, then a

for subdivisions); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 13, at 529-31 (same for compactness). It
would be even better, of course, to assess the impact of district-community congruence
directly rather than through proxies such as state legal provisions. A sequel to this Article
attempts such direct assessment. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 32.
363
In a recent article, Adam Cox and Richard Holden argue that the optimal gerrymandering strategy for a party is “to match slices of voters from opposite tails of the
[partisan] distribution” such that the party’s own die-hard supporters in a district
slightly outnumber the opposing party’s committed partisans. Adam B. Cox & Richard
T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 567
(2011). This “matching slices” strategy plainly cannot be executed when districts must
correspond to geographic communities. A requirement of district-community congruence thus renders unavailable the most potent political gerrymanders.
364
This data is on file with the author. The 2002 elections were the first to be held
during the 2000s redistricting cycle, and are thus particularly relevant for purposes of
bias and responsiveness. The twenty-six states that Cain and Hanley analyzed account
for about 75% of the country’s population.
365
See supra notes 33, 76 and accompanying text.
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366

plan would have a responsiveness of 2.0.
In general, the lower a
367
plan’s bias, and the higher its responsiveness, the better the plan is.
As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, bias was markedly lower and responsiveness was markedly higher in the states that paid heed to territorial
communities in the last redistricting cycle. Specifically, average bias
was 4.0 percentage points lower (5.4% versus 9.4%), while average re368
sponsiveness was higher by 0.40 (1.43 versus 1.03).
All the subcategories of states with community-respect provisions—i.e., states with
constitutional or statutory requirements, states with non-binding
guidelines, and states with prior relevant court decisions—also scored
better than the states with no such provisions. The differences in bias
369
And while
and responsiveness were statistically significant as well.
adherence to community boundaries did not remain a significant predictor of bias and responsiveness when I controlled for other common
370
redistricting criteria and aspects of states’ redistricting environ371
ments, the magnitude and direction of the variable’s coefficients

366

See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 544-45 (1994) (defining bias and responsiveness).
367
Reducing bias all the way to zero is unproblematic. However, very high rates of
responsiveness are undesirable because they result in large changes in seat shares despite only small shifts in vote shares. Fortunately, the responsiveness scores reported
here are not nearly high enough to raise such concerns.
368
These figures are for mean bias and responsiveness. Median bias was 2.5 percentage points lower (5.9% versus 8.4%), while median responsiveness was 0.33 higher
(1.34 versus 1.01).
369
Differences were assessed at the 5% significance level.
370
I coded community respect as an ordinal variable with the following possible
values: 0 if a state had no community-respect provision, 1 if a state had a non-binding
community-respect guideline, 2 if a state had a constitutional or statutory communityrespect provision, and 3 if a state had a prior applicable court decision. Because I expected (and found) largely linear relationships between community respect and the
various dependent variables, I did not convert community respect into dummy variables. The redistricting criteria for which I controlled were compactness, preservation
of political subdivisions, and preservation of the cores of prior districts. I obtained data
on these criteria from the NCSL and coded them all as dummy variables. See NCSL
GUIDE, supra note 193, at 106-08 & tbl.8. All the regressions I ran for this Article used
ordinary least squares. For regression results, see the Appendix.
371
The aspects for which I controlled were whether a state used a redistricting
commission, whether a party had unified control of a state government at the time of
redistricting, and whether courts ended up drawing a state’s district maps. I coded all
of these aspects as dummy variables. I obtained commission data from NCSL GUIDE,
supra note 193, at 161-62; data on unified party control from Carl Klarner, Klarner Data,
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continued to be consistent with the above results. Controlling for all
these factors, a shift from no community-respect provision at all to the
most stringent (i.e., judicial) enforcement of such a provision was associated with a fall in bias of 3.3 percentage points and a rise in responsiveness of 0.26.
This analysis, while preliminary, tends to refute the claims that the
territorial community test would disadvantage either major party or
make elections less competitive. In fact, the test’s implications for bias
and responsiveness seem to be not just neutral but actually somewhat
favorable. In the last redistricting cycle, states that respected community boundaries when they redrew their district maps treated the major
parties more fairly, and held elections that were more responsive to
changes in public opinion, than states that did not. These findings
should help allay misgivings about the potential impact of districtcommunity congruence on the American electoral system. Based on
the available evidence, such congruence would likely make the system
better—a bit less skewed in either party’s favor and a bit more respon372
sive to the views of the public—not worse.

ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. (2007), http://academic.udayton.edu/sppq-TPR/klarner_datapage.
html; and data on court-drawn plans from Jonathan Winburn, Comparing Redistricting
Outcomes Across the States: A Comparison of Commission, Court, and Legislative
Plans 24 tbl.4 (Mar. 3-4, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
kpsaweb.org/Hughes/Winburn.RedistrictingOutcomes.pdf.
372
Data for the remaining twenty-four states and for the rest of the 2000s redistricting cycle would help confirm these conclusions. So too would analysis based directly
on district-community congruence rather than proxies for it. See supra note 362; see also
Stephanopoulos, supra note 32 (manuscript at 55-57) (finding that district-community
congruence has a curvilinear relationship with bias and a positive relationship with
responsiveness).
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Figure 1: Average Partisan Bias by State Category
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Figure 2: Average Electoral Responsiveness by State Category
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2. Minority Representation
Turning next to minority representation, I used Census data to estimate the number of majority-minority districts in each state legisla373
tive chamber during the last redistricting cycle. I defined a majorityminority district as one in which any racial minority made up more
374
than 50% of the population.
I then calculated the difference between each state’s proportion of majority-minority districts (averaged
375
over both its chambers) and its minority population percentage. For
example, if a state had 15% majority-minority districts and a minority
population of 20%, then the gap for the state was 5%. The smaller
376
this gap, the better representation minorities presumably received.
As Figure 3 indicates, states that paid heed to community boundaries when they last redistricted had a slightly smaller difference between
their proportions of majority-minority districts and their minority population percentages. Specifically, the gap in these states was 2.7 percent377
age points lower (10.8% versus 13.5%).
In other words, minorities
appeared to receive slightly better legislative representation, relative to
their share of the overall state population, in community-respecting
states. The difference between the two categories of states was not

373

See United States Census 2000: State Legislative District Summary Files, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU ( Jan. 4, 2007), http://www.census.gov/census2000/sld_sumfiles.html. I did
not consider coalition or influence districts because of the fierce ongoing debates over
how to identify them and how to evaluate them relative to majority-minority districts.
Cf. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009) (holding that only majorityminority districts can ever be required under section 2 of the VRA).
374
Unfortunately, the Census data did not specify minority groups’ shares of the
voting-eligible (as opposed to total) population in each district. However, these metrics
are usually highly correlated.
375
I separately calculated the proportion of majority-minority districts in each state
legislative chamber, and then averaged the state house and state senate figures to obtain a single value for each state.
376
Cf. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 (1994) (evaluating minority representation in similar fashion). I do not claim that the gap should necessarily be zero. I
only compare states’ proportions of majority-minority districts to their minority population percentages so that I can have a benchmark by which to assess those proportions.
In addition, my analysis addresses descriptive representation only; it has nothing to say
about the caliber of minorities’ substantive representation.
377
The gap increases to 3.2 percentage points if states with less than a 10% minority
population (in which it is very difficult to draw majority-minority districts) are excluded
from the analysis. The gap changes to 2.3 percentage points if median figures are used.
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large; in fact, it just failed to rise to the level of statistical significance.
Nor was any clear pattern discernible in the subcategories of states that
enforced community-respect provisions more or less stringently. Still,
these results offer no support for the claim that district-community congruence systematically reduces minority representation. During the last
redistricting cycle, such congruence had either no link, or a slightly positive link, with states’ relative proportions of majority-minority districts.

Figure 3: Average Discrepancy Between Proportion of MajorityMinority Districts and Minority Population
Percentage by State Category
16%
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3. Voter Engagement
Though they are relatively favorable, the implications of the territorial community test for bias, responsiveness, and minority representation are somewhat fortuitous. As noted above, the test is not designed
to make district plans less biased, more responsive, or better for mi-

378

The difference was assessed at the 5% significance level.
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norities. That it appears to do so, relative to the status quo, is a product of the particular political and racial geography of contemporary
America—as well as an illustration of how flawed the status quo is.
However, the territorial community test is aimed at making voters
more invested in the political process and more likely to participate in
it. An important prediction of the theory of communal representation
(discussed above in Part I) is that relations between voters and elected
officials, as well as voters’ political engagement, should improve when
379
districts and communities coincide.
To assess this prediction, I
380
381
compiled data on voter turnout and trust in government for all
available states during the last redistricting cycle. Turnout is the proportion of the voting-eligible population that casts a ballot in a given
election. Trust in government is measured by survey on a scale from 0
to 100 points.
As Figures 4 and 5 show, both turnout and trust in government
were substantially higher in the states that paid heed to community
boundaries when they last redistricted. Specifically, average turnout
was 4.9 percentage points higher (55.5% versus 50.6%), while average
trust in government was 6.1 points higher (39.3 points versus 33.2
382
points). All the subcategories of states with community-respect provisions also scored better than the states without them. The differences in turnout and trust in government were statistically significant
383
as well. And adherence to community boundaries remained a significant predictor of turnout and trust in government even when I con384
trolled for other common redistricting criteria and demographic

379

See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
See Michael McDonald, Voter Turnout, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elections.
gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). I used turnout data for all fifty
states, for the highest office on the ballot, and from 2002 to 2008, in my analysis.
381
See Codebook Variable Documentation File, AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUD. 616 (Aug. 25,
2011), http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/cdf/anes_cdf_var.pdf. Data was available for forty-seven states and for the years 2002, 2004, and 2008.
382
These figures are for mean turnout and trust in government. Median turnout
was 6.6 percentage points higher (55.9% versus 49.3%), while median trust in government was 5.1 points higher (38.4 points versus 33.3 points).
383
Differences were assessed at the 5% significance level.
384
See supra note 370.
380
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385

variables.
In fact, controlling for all these factors, a shift from no
community-respect provision to the most stringent enforcement of
such a provision was associated with a turnout increase of 4.4 percentage points and a trust-in-government increase of 6.2 points.
This analysis indicates that, as predicted by the theory of communal
representation, the territorial community test is linked to higher voter
turnout and greater trust in government. This is a notable finding that
suggests that voters indeed respond favorably to improved districtcommunity congruence. Where districts and communities coincided
more closely over the last decade, voters were both more likely to go to
the polls and more trustful of their elected representatives. Democratic participation improved, in other words, while the usual electoral
386
pathologies were somewhat less virulent.

385

The demographic variables for which I controlled were household income, percent of population over 65, percent of population that is black, percent of population
that is Hispanic, and percent of population with a bachelor’s degree. I coded them all
as continuous variables. I obtained income data from State Median Income, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.html (last modified Nov. 1, 2011); age data from Age Data of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/age/age-st-cen.html; race data from
Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.
gov/popest/data/state/asrh/2009/SC-EST2009-03.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012);
and education data from SARAH R. CRISSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2009pubs/p20-560.pdf. For regression results, see the Appendix.
386
See supra note 362 (noting that conclusions would be bolstered by direct analysis
of district-community congruence); see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 32 (manuscript
at 35-36) (finding that rate of voter roll-off is lower in districts that correspond more
closely to communities).
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Figure 4: Average Voter Turnout by State Category
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Figure 5: Average Trust in Government by State Category
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B. The Political Science Literature
The political science literature largely confirms the above findings
and extends them in several interesting ways. The literature thus provides further evidence that the political implications of the territorial
community test’s adoption would likely be positive.
1. Bias and Responsiveness
To begin with, an array of studies, employing a variety of methods,
suggest that district-community congruence would give rise to less biased and more responsive district plans than the status quo. First, Roland Fryer and Richard Holden recently redrew the congressional
districts of four large states (California, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Texas) using an algorithm that minimized the spatial distance between
387
voters in each district. This redrawing, which the authors analogized
388
to reliance on territorial communities, resulted in substantially lower
bias and higher responsiveness scores. Average bias in the four states
fell from 4.9% to 2.4%, while average responsiveness doubled from 0.9
389
to 1.8. In other words, the revised (and more community-attentive)
district plans were about twice as fair and responsive as the states’ actual
maps.
Michael McDonald carried out a similar study for five Midwestern
states (Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin), redraw390
ing their districts using several different techniques.
He did not
calculate bias or responsiveness for his new maps, but, when he minimized congressional districts’ splits of Census places (i.e., political
subdivisions), he found notable improvements in other metrics of

387

See Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Richard Holden, Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans ( July 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/files/Compactness%20Final.pdf.
388
See id. at 2 n.5.
389
See id. at 51 tbl.2. But see Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Using Legislative Districting Simulations To Measure Electoral Bias in Legislatures 6, 14 ( July 15, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jowei/
florida.pdf (finding that redrawing Florida districts on basis of compactness would result in significant pro-Republican bias).
390
See MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, MIDWEST MAPPING PROJECT, available at http://
elections.gmu.edu/Midwest_Mapping_Project.pdf.
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fairness and competitiveness. In particular, the average proportion of
Democratic-leaning districts increased from 40% to 49%, and the average proportion of competitive districts increased from 44% to
391
While not as reliable as bias and responsiveness calculations,
51%.
these findings also illustrate the potential positive impact of district392
community congruence.
So too does recent scholarship on the geographic distribution of
the major U.S. parties’ supporters, which suggests that the territorial
community test would be unlikely to produce partisan imbalances.
Democrats, it turns out, are not more spatially concentrated than Republicans. Rather, “[b]oth Republicans and Democrats live in counties where about fifty percent of the voters share their own party,” and
the “isolation index,” a measure of partisan segregation, is actually
393
slightly higher for Republicans than for Democrats.
Accordingly,
neither party has much reason to fear that its voters would be particularly “packed” if districts were drawn to better coincide with geographic
communities.
The capacity of the territorial community test to curb gerrymandering is further confirmed by the strong record of requirements that
districts adhere to political subdivisions. One scholar found that highly partisan plans in the 1980s disregarded more subdivision boundaries

391

I calculated these averages myself using the data compiled by McDonald in the
Midwest Mapping Project.
392
See also DOUGLAS JOHNSON, THE ROSE INST. OF STATE & LOCAL GOV’T, COMPETITIVE DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA: A CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA’S REDISTRICTING IN THE
1990S 7-9 (2005), available at http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/rose/publications/
pdf/rose_ca_case_study.pdf (finding high level of competitiveness when California’s
districts were drawn in the 1990s to correspond to geographic communities).
393
Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, Myths and Realities of American Political Geography 6 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research Discussion Paper No. 2100, Nov. 23, 2005),
available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2006/HIER2100.pdf; see also
Philip A. Klinkner, Red and Blue Scare: The Continuing Diversity of the American Electoral
Landscape, 2 FORUM, no. 2, 2004, at 1, 7, http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol2/iss2/art2
(finding that “index of exposure” in 2000 was almost identical for Democrats and Republicans, “mean[ing] that the average Democrat and the average Republican lived in
a county that was close to evenly divided”); cf. MORRILL, supra note 58, at 21 (noting
that compactness requirement would have random partisan effects because both parties’ supporters are equally spatially concentrated); Polsby & Popper, supra note 13, at
334-35 (same).
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394

than bipartisan or nonpartisan plans.
If district drawers had been
obligated to follow subdivision lines, many heavily biased plans would
not have been possible. Similarly, Jonathan Winburn determined that,
in a range of states over the last decade, “the principle against splitting
political subdivisions play[ed] a key function in constraining the re395
Where such a provision existed,
mappers from gerrymandering.”
district plans were generally fair to the major parties; where it was ab396
sent, inequitable plans could be (and usually were) implemented.
The same would likely be true for a district-community congruence
requirement.
Lastly, a number of studies have established that challengers have
better odds of success in congressional districts that coincide with political subdivisions or media markets. The explanation for the improvement is that challengers are better able to convey their messages
(and names) to the public when districts have a cognizable identity
397
and media channels are efficiently structured. The boost is also surprisingly large. One study estimated that challengers receive 8% more
398
of the vote in high-congruence districts, while another study found
that a challenger is 16% more likely to win a voter’s support if the vot399
er can recall the challenger’s name. District-community congruence
thus not only correlates with, but also helps foster, increased electoral
competitiveness.
2. Minority Representation
There is less political science literature on the territorial community test’s effect on minority representation, but the available studies
suggest that minorities (just like Democrats) would not end up inefficiently overconcentrated. One study examined the relationship be-

394

See Morrill, supra note 44, at 225-26.
JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING: FOLLOWING THE RULES
AND LIMITING GERRYMANDERING IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 9 (2008).
396
Id. at 200-02.
397
See GRONKE, supra note 342, at 23, 97; Campbell et al., supra note 342, at 671-73;
Levy & Squire, supra note 342, at 317-19; Niemi et al., supra note 339, at 193; Prinz,
supra note 342, at 310-12.
398
Campbell et al., supra note 342, at 673-74.
399
Levy & Squire, supra note 342, at 321-23.
395
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tween political subdivision preservation requirements and the numbers of majority-minority and minority-influence districts within states.
The study found that such requirements have no impact on the number of majority-minority districts in a state, but increase the number of
400
Similarly, another study analyzed how
minority-influence districts.
often districts with varying proportions of minority voters cross county
lines. The study determined that districts with the highest percentages
of African American and Hispanic voters split counties more frequent401
As long as political subdivisions are a dely than all other districts.
cent proxy for geographic communities, the upshot of these studies is
that higher district-community congruence would likely result in more
minority-influence districts, about the same number of majorityminority districts, and fewer supermajority-minority (i.e., “packed”)
districts. This is not an outcome that should alarm proponents of minority representation.
3. Voter Engagement
Finally, the political science literature indicates that both voter
knowledge and voter turnout tend to increase as districts and communities coincide more closely. With regard to voter knowledge, a series
of studies have shown that voters are better informed about politics
when they live in high-congruence districts. One study found that voters in districts that correspond well to media markets are 8% more
likely to recognize incumbent politicians’ names, and 19% more likely
402
An analogous study determined
to recognize challengers’ names.
that voters in districts that mirror political subdivisions are 8% more

400

Barabas & Jerit, supra note 362, at 423. In contrast, compactness requirements
reduced the numbers of both majority-minority and minority-influence districts. Id. at
429; see also Carmen Cirincione et al., Assessing South Carolina’s 1990s Congressional Districting, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 189, 201-02 (2000) (finding that redrawing South Carolina’s
congressional districts so as to minimize county splits would likely result in one minority-influence district and no majority-minority districts).
401
See W. Mark Crain, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting: An Empirical Analysis, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 193, 207 fig.3 & 208 fig.4 (2001); see also id. at 209-10 (finding strong positive relationship between minority percentage in district and district’s
proportion of split Census places).
402
Campbell et al., supra note 342, at 672. The larger increase for challengers explains why they do better in high-congruence districts. See supra notes 397-99 and accompanying text.
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likely to recall incumbents’ names, and 12% more likely to recall chal403
Taking a slightly different tack, another study conlengers’ names.
cluded that voters in high-congruence districts are 14% more likely to
state correctly their representatives’ votes in Congress than voters in
404
low-congruence districts.
The story with turnout is similar (though not quite as clear-cut).
One study found that district congruence with media markets is strongly
linked to higher turnout, but that district-county congruence has no
405
effect on it. Another study reported that neither media market nor
406
county congruence has a statistically significant impact on turnout.
A further study determined that districts that are more compact tend
407
to have higher turnout.
A Canadian study, lastly, concluded that,
after Ontario’s districts were redrawn in the 1980s, turnout rose in the
districts that corresponded best to geographic communities, and fell
408
in the districts that corresponded worst. These results are therefore
inconclusive, but they do at least hint at a positive relationship between district-community congruence and voter turnout.
CONCLUSION
As the current redistricting cycle continues to unfold, America’s
courts find themselves in a deeply problematic position. They are as-

403

See Niemi et al., supra note 339, at 192 tbl.1.
Lipinski, supra note 342, at 93; see also VINSON, supra note 342, at 44; Engstrom,
supra note 340, at 78; Levy & Squire, supra note 342, at 319; Prinz, supra note 342, at
310-12; Schaffner & Sellers, supra note 343, at 52-53; Winburn & Wagner, supra note
340, at 378. These quantitative findings are corroborated by the dozens of in-depth
interviews that Malcolm Jewell conducted with state legislators across the country. The
politicians told Jewell that voters are often confused by district lines that disregard
community boundaries, and that it is difficult for representatives to learn about and
address their constituents’ problems when districts and communities do not correspond. See JEWELL, supra note 46, at 55-60, 168.
405
Engstrom, supra note 340, at 74-75, 77.
406
Winburn & Wagner, supra note 340, at 382.
407
Altman, supra note 91, at 333-34.
408
COURTNEY, supra note 85, at 210-11; see also DAVID E. CAMPBELL, WHY WE VOTE:
HOW SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES SHAPE OUR CIVIC LIFE 23-24, 42 (2006) (finding that
turnout is higher in economically, ethnically, politically, and racially homogeneous
communities); Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 78486 (2008) (summarizing political science literature showing that minority turnout is
higher in majority-minority districts).
404
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sured by a unanimous Supreme Court that political gerrymandering
can sometimes be unconstitutional—but majorities of that same Court
have also rejected every standard suggested to date for distinguishing
valid from invalid district plans. This Article has sought to offer a way
out of this judicial limbo: the territorial community test, under which
courts would assess electoral districts based on how well they correspond to underlying geographic communities. As the Article has argued, the test has a robust theoretical and historical pedigree, it
already animates much of the redistricting case law, it could be administered capably by the judiciary, and its political implications would be
quite positive.
It is true that the territorial community test does not aim directly
at the heart of what is typically understood today to be the problem
with political gerrymandering: the deliberate manipulation of district
lines in order to help or harm particular parties or candidates. But
the test does attack another aspect of gerrymandering that has been
bemoaned since the days of Elbridge Gerry: the lack of congruence
between gerrymandered districts and organic geographic communities. The test also does (even though it is not designed to) make elections fairer for both major parties and more responsive to changes in
public opinion. But perhaps the most important point is this: the Supreme Court has already ruled out just about every standard that
would explicitly tackle partisan unfairness or incumbent entrenchment. At this point, more oblique measures are all that are left. And
of these judicial bank shots, there seems to be none more promising
than the territorial community test. Second-best may now be the best
we can do.
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–

-0.29 (0.21)

0.18 (0.27)

0.31 (0.21)

0.08 (0.10)

0.19

26

0.80 (0.17)***

0.50 (0.27)*

0.17 (0.17)

0.33 (0.20)

–

–

–

0.11 (0.09)

Model 3:
Redistricting
Environment

0.18

26

0.79 (0.26)**

0.46 (0.32)

0.19 (0.18)

0.12 (0.26)

-0.40 (0.25)

0.13 (0.28)

0.15 (0.25)

0.09 (0.10)

Model 4:
All

Redistricting and the Territorial Community

Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error).
N = 26 states for which data is available
* P < 0.10
** P < 0.05
*** P < 0.01

26

N

1.06 (0.11)***

–

Subdivision Preservation

Constant

–

0.18 (0.08)**

Compactness

Community Respect

Variables

Model 2:
Other
Redistricting Criteria

2012]

Model 1:
Community Respect
Alone

Table 2. Electoral Responsiveness Regressions
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–
–
–
–
–
–

Prior District Core Preservation
Household Income
% Population over 65
% Population Black
% Population Hispanic
% Population with Bachelor’s
Degree

0.19

Adjusted R-Squared

0.20

50

0.51 (0.02)***

–

–

–

–

–

-0.04 (0.02)*

0.009 (0.03)

0.003 (0.02)

0.02 (0.01)***

0.43

50

0.35 (0.10)***

0.32 (0.26)

-0.20 (0.07)***

-0.17 (0.09)**

0.44 (0.48)

0.000001 (0.000002)

–

–

–

0.01 (0.007)*

Model 3:
Socioeconomic
Data

0.40

50

0.35 (0.11)***

0.32 (0.27)

-0.20 (0.08)**

-0.14 (0.10)

0.44 (0.49)

0.000001 (0.000002)

-0.01 (0.02)

0.009 (0.02)

-0.002 (0.02)

0.02 (0.01)*

Model 4:
All

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error).
N = all 50 states
* P < 0.10
** P < 0.05
*** P < 0.01

50

N

0.51 (0.01)***

–

Constant

–

Subdivision Preservation

0.03 (0.01)***

Compactness

Community Respect

Variables

Model 2:
Other
Redistricting Criteria
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Model 1:
Community Respect
Alone

Table 3. Voter Turnout Regressions
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–
–
–
–
–
–

Prior District Core Preservation
Household Income
% Population over 65
% Population Black
% Population Hispanic
% Population with Bachelor’s
Degree

Adjusted R -Squared

0.12

47

32.50 (2.81)***

–

–

–

–

–

-2.79 (2.16)

2.28 (3.00)

0.49 (2.13)

2.41 (1.03)**

0.29

47

23.75 (13.66)*

-16.14 (37.55)

-23.92 (9.39)**

-16.17 (10.93)

57.56 (66.30)

0.0002 (0.0003)

–

–

–

2.13 (1.03)*

Model 3:
Socioeconomic
Data

0.24

47

21.79 (14.45)

-16.60 (39.13)

-23.55 (9.74)**

-15.04 (13.12)

60.14 (68.71)

0.0002 (0.0003)

-0.60 (2.41)

1.90 (2.80)

-0.42 (2.00)

2.07 (1.16)*

Model 4:
All

Redistricting and the Territorial Community

Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error).
N = 47 states for which data is available
* P < 0.10
** P < 0.05
*** P < 0.01

47
0.13

N

33.86 (1.14)***

–

Constant

–

Subdivision Preservation

2.67 (0.94)***

Compactness

Community Respect

Variables

Model 2:
Other
Redistricting Criteria

2012]

Model 1:
Community Respect
Alone

Table 4. Trust in Government Regressions
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